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INTRODUCTION

Let us posit a hypothetical young, single, unattached working
woman. She rented an apartment in West Hollywood with two friends a
year or two ago. The rent is more than she can afford alone, and when
one of her friends moves in with his boyfriend, and the other moves back
to Ohio, she finds herself in need of roommates if she does not want to
move out.
She obviously has preferences about the persons with whom she
wants to share her living space. Suppose, after her experiences in college
and afterward, she has concluded that she is "not looking for freaks,
geeks, prostitutes (male or female), druggies, pet cobras, drama, black
muslims or mortgage brokers.,,1 While in the past she might have placed
an ad in local and college newspapers, or hung a sign in a laundromat or
coffee shop, today she would surely go online. One of the online
businesses that matches those seeking roommates with those seeking
shared living situations is Roommate.com.
When our roommate-seeker registers at www.roommates.com she
will be asked a series of questions, and taken through a series of dropdown menus. Her answers to these questions, and her responses to more
freeform queries about what she is looking for, will then be posted online
for housing seekers to view. The service will also match her with
prospective roommates on the basis of her answers to those questions
(and match them with her the same way). The content of those
questions, and the online publication and use of the answers, has created
a question of unlawful housing discrimination, and has brought two
strong public policies-housing antidiscrimination law and Internet
I This language appeared in an actual Roommate.com ad. See Fair Housing Council of
San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC (Fair Housing Council), No. CV 03-09386PA(RZK),
2004 WL 3799488, at *2 (C.O. Cal. Sep. 30, 2004). The Ninth Circuit opinion is captioned Fair
Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC (Roommates. com I), 489 F.3d
921 (9th Cir. 2007). However, in the papers filed by Roommate.com, the entity is identified as it is
in the district court opinion (with "Roommate" in the singular). See, e.g., Brief of Appellee at *1,
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 489 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2007)
(Nos. 04-56916, 04-57173) 2005 WL 2598925. In the first Ninth Circuit opinion, the entity is
incorrectly identified as "Roommates.com," perhaps because the website is www.roommates.com
(italics added), and it is captioned inconsistently in the Ninth Circuit en bane opinion. The Court
remarked, "For unknown reasons, the company goes by the singular name 'Roommate. com, LLC'
but pluralizes its website's URL, www.roommates.com ... Fair Housing Council of San Fernando
Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC (Roommate. com /I), 521 F.3d 1157, 1161 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008) (en
bane). In this Article, the entity will be referred to throughout as "Roommate.com," except where
the first Ninth Circuit opinion is referred to by its title. The Ninth Circuit decisions will be referred
to as Roommates.com I (three judge panel decision) and Roomate.com /I (en bane decision) to
simplify references to the two Ninth Circuit decisions, while maintaining consistency with the
captions on the two decisions.
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service provider immunity-into conflict. 2 The Fair Housing Council
litigation against Roommate.com brings this conflict to the federal court. 3
Two fair housing organizations, Fair Housing Council of the San
Fernando Valley and the Fair Housing Council of San Diego, have
alleged that the information collected and disseminated by
Roommate.com violated the provision of the federal Fair Housing Act
("FHA") that prohibits the advertisement of housing rentals that indicate
any "preference, limitation or discrimination" with respect to
membership in a number of protected categories. Roommate.com
obtained a summary judgment in its favor on the basis of its immunity
under the Communications Decency Act ("CDA"), which protects
interactive computer service providers by preventing their treatment as
"publishers" of content provided by third parties.
In Fair Housing Council v. Roommate. com, LLC (Roommate. com
II),4 the Ninth Circuit has taken an important step in articulating how the
antidiscrimination policies of the FHA5 are to be harmonized with the
robust speech protections embodied in the immunity provisions of the
CDA. 6 After a "brain trust" panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals-Judges Alex Kozinski, Stephen Reinhardt, and Kozinski's
former clerk, Sandra Ikuta-determined that Roommate.com is an
"information content provider" ill Fair Housing Council v.
Roommates.com (Rommates.com 1),7 reversing the district court,8 the
Ninth Circuit en bane panel, 9 in a majority opinion again written by
Judge Kozinski, reached the same result. On this basis, in the Ninth
Circuit at least, Roommate.com and services like it do not enjoy
completely unfettered immunity from publisher liability for violating an
important civil rights law, simply because the discriminatory advertising
is disseminated over the Internet, rather than on paper. 10 In these times
of troubling civil rights retrenchment, II the Ninth Circuit decision makes
2

See generally www.roommates.com
See Fair Housing Council, 2004 WL 3799488, at *2-5 .
4 Roommate.com II, F.3d at 1157.
5 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-09,3631 (enacted in 1968, amended in 1974 and 1988), Pub.L. 90-284,
82. Stat. 73-92; Pub.L. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (1974 Amendment); Pub.L. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619
(1988 Amendment).
6
47 U.S.C. §§ 230, Pub.L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 137 (1996); Pub.L. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681
(1998).
7 Roommates.com I, 489 F.3d at 927.
8 See Fair Housing Council, 2004 WL 3799488, at *4 .
9 Unlike most circuits where all active judges hear an en bane case, the Ninth Circuit assigns
the Chief Judge and ten randomly selected active judges to sit on en banc panels. 9TH CIR. R. 35-3.
10 Roommate.com II, 521 F.3d 1157, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
II See, e.g., Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. I (and its
3
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it possible to carry the ever-more-urgent mandate of the Fair Housing
Act forward into the Internet age, and as such, it should be applauded.
On remand, the federal district court for the Central District of
California is poised to determine whether Roommate.com's software
questionnaire and drop-down menus, used to match possible roommates
based on information sought and provided about membership in
protected classes such as race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial
status, and national origin, violates § 804(c) of the Fair Housing Act. 12
This Article illuminates the bases of the Ninth Circuit's decision and
clarifies the issues on remand. 13
In Part I, the substantive non-discrimination provisions of the FHA,
§ 804(a), (b), and (f),14 subject to the exemptions of § 803(b)(2),15 are
contrasted with the exceptionless non-discriminatory advertising
provision, § 804(c). This section also sets out the policy rationales for
this apparent inconsistency and inefficiency in the law. Part II explores §
230(c) and § 230(f) of the Communications Decency Act, their purposes,
and the scope of the immunity they provide as understood by recent
cases. Part III brings the FHA and the CDA together, analyzing both the
Seventh Circuit case addressing § 230 immunity and the Fair Housing
Act, Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v.
companion case, Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Ed. (Louisville, Kentucky)), 127 S.Ct. 2738
(2007). In striking down Seattle's voluntary desegregation plan, even the majority opinion
acknowledged "the effects of racially identifiable housing patterns on school assignments," Id. at
2747. Justice Breyer's dissent argued more forcefully that "the distinction between de jure
segregation (caused by school systems) and de facto segregation (caused, e.g., by housing patterns or
generalized societal discrimination) is meaningless in the present context" (i.e., permissible remedies
in education)." /d. at 2802. Some, of course, would deny any discrimination with respect to housing
either. See, e.g., id. at 2769 ( Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Although presently observed racial
imbalance might result from past de jure segregation, racial imbalance can also result from any
number of innocent private decisions, including voluntary housing choices") (emphasis added). Few
can doubt, however, that in an environment free of housing discrimination, racial "imbalance"
among neighborhood schools would be less pernicious.
1242 U.S.C.A. § 3604(c) (Westlaw 2008). Section 804(c) of the FHA will be generally be
referred to herein as § 3604(c).
13 Some scholars suggest that no judicial interpretation will be satisfactory. Robert G.
Schwemm, University of Kentucky College of Law professor, argues that "'However the courts go,
Congress is going to have to return to the Fair Housing Act regarding media that is covered or not
covered' .... Clearly, he says, the Internet should not have an exemption, but the Communications
Decency Act makes things difficult because it shields Web operators whose content is provided by
users." Stephanie Francis Ward, With Roomies-Be Careful HolV You Ask For Them: 9th Circuit
opinion applies fair housing rule on discrimination to Web site, ABA J. E-REPORT, May 25, 2007.
See also Robert G. Schwemm, Discriminatory Housing Statements and 3604(c): A New Look at the
Fair Housing Act's Most Intriguing Provision, 29 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 187,211 (2001).
1442 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(b),(f) (Westlaw 2008). Sections 804(a) and (b) will also be referred
to herein as § 3604(a) and (b).
IS 42 U.S.c.A. § 3603(b) (Westlaw 2008). Section 803(b)(2) will also be referred to herein
as § 3603(b).
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Craigslist, Inc., and Fair Housing Council v. Roommate.com
(Roomate.com II). The analysis of Roommate. com II includes theories of
liability, the initial result in the district court, the first Ninth Circuit
opinion in Roomates. com I
(including Judge Reinhardt's partial
concurrence and partial dissent, and Ikuta's concurrence), and the en
banc decision. Part IV addresses some lingering First Amendment issues
that may reappear in the litigation, and Part V discusses whether
Craigslist and Roommate. com II have created a Circuit split ripe for U.S.
Supreme Court review.

1.

WHEN Is IT LAWFUL To DISCRIMINATE, BUT NOT To ADVERTISE
THAT You DO? WHEN YOU'RE LOOKING FOR A ROOMMATE [§
3604(C) OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT]

The federal Fair Housing Act contains a loophole big enough to
drive a Mack truck full of roommate-seekers through-and that loophole
is both the background to this lawsuit and the key to Roommate.com's
business model. The core of the FHA is a set of substantive antidiscrimination provisions. Under § 3604(a), (b), and (f), it is illegal to
discriminate in selling or renting a dwelling (or in the terms and
conditions of such sale or rental), on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, familial status, national origin, or handicap. 16 However, under §
3603(b) (the so-called "Mrs. Murphy" exemption 1\ persons renting out
a room or unit of an owner-occupied building of 4 families or fewer
(including persons seeking a "roommate," typically in an apartment), are
exempt from these requirements. 18 The "Mrs. Murphy" exemption
operates as an affIrmative defense to a charge of violation of § 3604(a),
(b), and (f).19 However, although this exemption permits certain forms

16 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(a)-(b) (Westlaw 2008) (race, color, religion, sex, familial status,
national origin); 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(f) (Westlaw 2008) (handicap).
17 The original idea was that the statute did not reach an imagined "Mrs. Murphy's
boardinghouse," run by a Mrs. Murphy who did not wish to rent to Blacks. 114 Congo Rec. 2495,
3345 (1968). Some scholars have recommended abolishing the exemption, "which ... became part
of the FHA, [although] it was originally introduced as part of the public accommodation act of Title
II." Theresa Keeley, An Implied Warranty of Freedom from Sexual Harassment: The Solution for
Harassed Tenants Where the Fair Housing Act Has Failed, 38 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 397, 422 &
n.140. See, e.g., James D. Walsh, Reaching Mrs. Murphy: A Call for Repeal of the Mrs. Murphy
Exemption to the Fair Housing Act, 34 HARV. c.R.-c.L. L. REV. 605 (1999). Amusingly, one of the
few recent cases to make out a prima facie case of national origin discrimination was brought byyou guessed it-a "Mrs. Murphy," specifically, Mrs. Catherine Murphy, against a co-op board.
Murphy v. 253 Garth Tenants Corp., 579 F.Supp. 1150 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
18 42 U.S.C.A. § 3603(b)(2) (Westlaw 2008). Section 3603(b)(I) contains an exemption
applicable to certain housing sales.
19 U.S. V. Space Hunters, Inc., 429 F.3d 416, 426 (2d Cir. 2005).
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of discrimination by those actually renting out certain classes of
residential space, the FHA also contains a global anti-discrimination
provision applicable to all persons advertising available housing.
Section 3604(c) makes it unlawful, without exception,
To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published
any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or
rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial
status, or national origin, or an intention to make any such preference,
limitation, or discrimination?O

Note that this provision also expressly creates publisher liability for
those who disseminate discriminatory advertisements ("publish, or cause
to be... published"), not just those who place the ads. The law expands
the class of those held legally responsible for non-discrimination in
housing to include not just housing providers, but those who publish their
advertisements. Put another way, it makes publishing discriminatory
advertisements a distinct, actionable form of wrongdoing, separate from
and in addition to either placing such ads, or simply denying housing to
persons for unlawful reasons, with or without advertising. Under the
FHA, the "actual wrongdoers" are not limited to those "who originate the
allegedly unlawful content"-by writing and placing the ads-but also
those who publish them. 21
Those who fall within the § 3603(b) exemption are permitted to
discriminate in the selection of their roommates or fellow tenants, in all
sorts of ways that would be prohibited if they were simply selling the
house, or renting a unit in a building they happened to own but not
occupy. Persons renting out apartments or rooms in sufficiently intimate
circumstances are thus exempt from the general non-discrimination
provisions of the FHA. What they are not permitted to do, however, is
advertise these preferences. Persons seeking a roommate are subjected
to the same restrictions in advertising for that roommate, as are persons
renting or selling residential real estate of all kinds, and those who
publish those ads are subject to a uniform non-discrimination standard.
42 U.S.C.A. 3604(c) (Westlaw 2008).
21 It is therefore a mistake to argue, as do the amici in Chicago Lawyers Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 681 (N.D. III. 2006), that "the federal
Fair Housing [sicllaws should have force in the online world" (emphasis in original) but should not
apply to publishers. Brief for Amazon.com, Inc., et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Craigslist's
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Craigslisl, 461 F.Supp.2d 681 (N.D. III. 2006) (No. 06 C
0657), 2006 WL 1794487. The federal fair housing laws, to "have force in the online world," must
apply to publishers, as they did prior to the Internet (and do still, "offline") ..
20
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This creates an obvious, built-in inefficiency, because housing
advertisements cannot be targeted to a desirably limited population. If
the proverbial Mrs. Murphy wants to populate her boardinghouse
exclusively with able-bodied white Irish Catholic bachelors between
thirty and forty (or bisexual dyslexic Asian single mothers under twentyfive, for that matter), she cannot simply say so in a newspaper classified
ad. Because § 3604( c) requires an advertisement to be vague and nondiscriminatory, it may invite inquiries, visits, and so on, from persons
Mrs. Murphy will not rent to (for whatever reason). It would obviously
be much easier, and more efficient, if Mrs. Murphy could simply
advertise for what she is actually looking for - it saves time all the way
around. 22 It therefore seems irrational to require housing providers like
Mrs. Murphy to place advertisements that appear to make housing
available to many persons in whom she has no interest. This is an
inefficiency Roommate.com sought precisely to avoid, and indeed,
capitalize upon. 23
This overbreadth in the FHA is not an inadvertent oversight. From
the beginning, courts that have addressed it have unanimously declined
to apply the exemption of § 3603(b) to § 3604(c)?4 For example, in
Holmgren v. Little Village Community Reporter,25 a federal district court
in Illinois in 1971 held that an ad stating a preference for renters of
various nationalities ("Polish, Bohemian, Slavish [sic], German, Spanish
and American") constituted impermissible national origin discrimination,
under § 3604(c), although actually selecting a tenant on this basis would
not violate the FHA, because the exemption applied. 26
22 It also avoids the dignitary injury suffered by one who caIls to inquire about, or attempts to
look at, housing, only to be told by the landlord, "I don't rent to X's." I thank my daughter, Siobhan
Mahaffey, for pointing this out, emphasizing (as a teenager would) how "embarrassing" or
"awkward" this would be. I would like to think landlords might find it more difficult to discriminate
face-to- face, but perhaps I am wrong about that.
23 For example, as Bryan Peters of Roommate.com testified by declaration, "Some
Roommate.com users have religious beliefs that impact their selection of roommates. Many are
Christians.... By referencing these beliefs in their profiles, users avoid the need to contact and
interview dozens of incompatible people." Roommates.com I, 489 F.3d 921, 932 (9th Cir. 2007)
(Reinhardt, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). A sensitive and sophisticated discussion of the
efficiencies and inefficiencies associated with the FHA can be found in Lior Jacob Strahilevitz,
Infonnation Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1867-8, 1886-1887,
1893-1894 (2006).
24 See, e.g. CampbeIl v. Robb, 162 Fed.Appx. 460,465 n.7, (6th Cir. 2006); U.S. v. Hunter,
459 F.2d 205, 213-14(4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972); Gonzalez v. Rakkas, No. 93
CV 3229 (JS), 1995 WL 451034, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 25,1995) ("The 'four-unit' exemption, also
referred to as the 'Mrs. Murphy' exemption, of Section 3603(b)(2) does not apply to statements
proscribed under Section 3604(c)").
25
342 F. Supp. 512 (N .D. Ill. 1971).
26 Id. at 513-514. ("This decision does not, however, preclude the same sellers and landlords
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In 2005, the Second Circuit adjudicated U.S. v. Space Hunters, Inc.,
a case in some ways quite similar to Fair Housing Council v.
Roommate. com, and made clear that § 3604(c) liability was not to be
trimmed to fit the § 3603(b)(2) exemption. 27
Defendant John
McDermott, through his company, "Space Hunters, Inc.," operated what
now seems an almost quaintly old-fashioned version of Roommate.com's
online enterprise. 28 As the Second Circuit described it,
Space Hunters, in its capacity as a housing information vender [sic],
compiles information from classified advertisements about rooms for
rent in New York City, advertises the availability of rooms for rent,
communicates with owners or landlords of rooms for rent, and refers
prospective tenants according to their preferred neighborhood and
price range. Space Hunters charges prospective tenants a fee for its
services, usually $100 for an individual and $125 for a couple?9
Space Hunters operated out of a small one-man office, communicating
with housing seekers by telephone and via in-office visits. 3D
The U.S. Attorney, following up on complaints filed with the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, alleged violations of
the substantive provisions of the FHA (§ 3604(a), (b), and (f)), as well as
violations of § 3604(c). The district court dismissed most of the claims,
holding, among other things, "that section 804(c) of the FHA (42 U.S.c.
§ 3604(c)) applies only to dwelling owners and their agents. The
[district] court found that Space Hunters is neither an owner nor an
agent, and, thus, the Government failed to state a section 804(c) claim.,,31
According to the Second Circuit, the district court erroneously
reached this conclusion by relying on what it said to be the 'purpose'
of the statute: 'to prevent expressions that result in the denial of
housing, not to prevent all discriminatory expression.' Because it
who are no longer permitted to express national origin preferences in newspaper ads from exercising
such a preference in personal negotiations with prospecti ve bu yers and tenants, provided, of course,
that the sellers and landlords come within the terms of 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)"). It might, however,
violate the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which bars all racial discrimination in the sale or rental of
property. JESSE DUKEMINIER, ET AL., PROPERTY 379 (6th ed. 2006). See also 42 U.S.c. § 1982. At
least in 1866, "German" would likely have been treated as a "race," and that is the relevant year for
interpreting that term.
27 U.S. v. Space Hunters, Inc., 429 F.3d 416, 416 (2d Cir. 2005).
28 "Space Hunters, Inc." is a one-man operation. "McDermott is the sole employee of Space
Hunters and has never denied that he was the Space Hunters representative on all the telephone calls
at issue in this case." [d. at 420 n.2.
29 [d. at419.
30 [d. at 422.
31 [d. at 421.
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found that defendants are neither owners nor agents and that applying
section 804(c) to them 'would not further the purpose of the statute,'
the district court dismissed Claims Three and Seven?2

The Second Circuit rejected this interpretation, and held
McDermott, as a "housing information vendor" who compiled and sold
information drawn from classified ads about rooms for rent in New York
City, liable under § 3604(c), notwithstanding whether the rooms
advertised were located in residences covered by the § 3603(b )(2)
exemption. 33
The Second Circuit's decision clarified both the scope of § 3604(c)
and some of its purposes:
The district court's assessment of the 'purpose' of section 804(c) is
inconsistent with the statute's plain language, which applies broadly to
'any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or
rental of a dwelling that indicates' a discriminatory preference on
prohibited grounds. 42 U.S.c. § 3604(c) (emphasis added). Nothing
in this language limits the statute's reach to owners or agents or to
statements that directly effect a housing transaction. Indeed, this
language 'does not provide any specific exemptions or designate the
persons covered, but rather ... applies on its face to anyone' who
makes prohibited statements. 34

The Second Circuit was unequivocal III endorsing the uniform
application of § 3604(c).
The Second Circuit also identified one of the broader purposes of §
3604(c):
[T]he district court's view that section 804(c)'s purpose is to 'prevent
expressions that result in the denial of housing' is too narrow. The
statute also 'protect[s] against [the] psychic injury' caused by

32

Id. at 424.

33

Space Hunters, 429 F.3d at 416.
ld. at 424 (citing U.S. v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 210 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
934 (1972); and Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Congress used broad
language in [section 804(c)l, and there is no cogent reason to narrow the meaning of that
language."), and rejecting Michigan Protection & Advocacy Service, Inc. v. Babin, 799 F.Supp. 695
(E.D.Mich. 1992), affd on other grounds, 18 F.3d 337 (6th Cir.1994); and Heights Community
Congress v. Hilltop Realty, Inc., 629 F.Supp. 1232 (N.D. Ohio 1983), affd in part, rev'd in part,
774 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1985), to the extent that they limit the application of section 804(c) to owners
and their agents).
34
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discriminatory statements made in connection with the housing
market. 35

For example, the Second Circuit also recognized a related right "to
inquire about the availability of housing without being subjected to
racially discriminatory statements.,,36 Both of these protections are
offered as explanations for the discrepancy between §3604(c) and the
exemptions under §3603(b),37 and for an independent cause of action
under §3604(c).38
Other courts have also attempted to identify reasons for this (in one
sense) too-broad prohibition. The FHA was originally enacted in 1968
against a background of systematic and widespread racial discrimination
in both the sale and rental of housing. Though Shelley v. Kraemer was
decided in 1948,39 declaring state enforcement of racially restrictive
covenants a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, residential racial
segregation remained severe for decades thereafter. 40 Home ownership
by people of color was further frustrated by discriminatory lending
practices. "Redlining," narrowly defined as "the practice whereby
mortgage lenders figuratively draw a red line around minority
neighborhoods and refuse to make mortgage loans available inside the
red lined area,'>'!l and broadly as "not only the direct refusal to lend in
minority neighborhoods, but also procedures that discourage the
submission of mortgage loan applications from minority areas, and
35 Space Hunters, 429 F.3d at 424 (2nd Cir. 2005) (citing
Robert G. Schwemm,
Discriminatory Housing Statements and § 3604(c): A New Look at the Fair Housing Act's Most
Intriguing Provision, 29 FORDHAM_URB. LJ. 187,250 (2001)).
36 Space Hunters, 429 F.3d at 424 (citing HUD ex reI. Stover v. Gruzdaitis, No. 02-96-03778,1998 WL482759, at *3 (HUD AU Aug. 14,1998)).
31
Space Hunters,429 F.3d at 425.
38/d. at 425 ("In fact, we have permitted plaintiffs to recover for discriminatory advertising
even when the plaintiffs were not in the market for housing. See Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real
Estate Co., 6 F.3d 898, 903-04 (2d Cir.1993).").
39 334 U.S. I, 20 (1948).
40 Robert G. Schwemm, Why Do Londlords Still Discriminate (And What Can Be Done
About It)?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 455, 456-60 (2007); Jonathan Brown with Charles Bennington,
A Study of Racial Discrimination by Banks and Mortgage Companies in the United States, pI. I,
http://www.public-gis.orglreportslredl.html(last visited April 30,2008).
Racially restrictive covenants were private agreements between neighboring homeowners, by which
each homeowner agreed for himself and his successors to sell his or her own property only to
persons of a particular race (and that race was inevitably White). While Shelley v. Kraemer did not
outlaw such covenants, it barred judicial enforcement of the covenants in favor of White
homeowners (like the Kraemers) in the event that one of their neighbors breached and sold the
property to a Black family (like the Shelleys). Shelley, 334 U.S. at 21-22.
4\ Brown with Bennington, A Study of Racial Discrimination by Banks and Mortgage
Companies in the United States, pI. I, http://www.public-gis.orglreports/redl.html (last visited April
30,2008).
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marketing policies that exclude such areas,,,42 was common (and still
is).43
A would-be homeowner of color was thus likely to be forced into
the rental residential real estate market, where he or she encountered still
further patterns of racial discrimination and "steering.,,44 Steering is "not
an outright refusal to rent to a person within a class of people protected
by the statute; rather it consists of efforts to deprive a protected
homeseeker of housing opportumtIes in certain locations. ,,45
Unfortunately, housing discrimination is not a relic of a bygone era. 46
The FHA, as enacted in 1968, reflected a sweeping prohibition on
allowing private property owners in the residential housing market to use
the selection of tenants to further racial discrimination and residential
segregation in the United States. At that time, the protected categories
were race, color, religion, and national origin. In 1974, sex was added,
and in 1988, familial status and handicap were added, along with
provisions protecting renters with handicapped family members. People
in these protected groups continue to face discrimination in obtaining
housing unrelated to their ability to pay the rent, and antidiscrimination
laws are underenforced. 47
The exemption under § 3603(b) should therefore be understood as a
narrow exception to the FHA's mandates, in order to balance fair
42

[d.

43 See. e.g., Thomas M. Shapiro, Race, Homeownership and Wealth, 20 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'y 53, 66-67 (2006). Section 905(a) of Pub. L. 102-550 provided that:

The Congress finds that-'in 1991, data collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
disclosed evidence of pervasive discrimination in the Nation's mortgage lending markets; the
Housing Discrimination Survey, released by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development in 1991, found that Hispanic and African-American homeseekers experience
some form of discrimination in at least half of their encounters with sales and rental agents.
Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 905(a), 106 Stat. 3672
(1992). See also Schwemm, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REv. at 459.
44 Racial steering has also been defined as the intentional behavior of real estate agents to
direct clients to specific neighborhoods on the basis of race or ethnicity. Kennedy Smith, Report by
American Planning Association studies racial steering, DAILY JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, July II,
2005, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4184/is_2005071I1ai_n 14719721 (last
visited April 30, 2008). See also George Galaster and Erin Godfrey, By Words and Deeds: Racial
Steering by Real Estate Agents in 2000,71 J. AM. PLANNING ASS'N 251 (2005).
45 HUD v. Edelstein, 2 Fair Hous.-Fair. Lend (PH), 'II 25,018, 25,236, 25,239, 1991 WL
442784 (HUD A.L.J. Dec. 9, 1991).
46 See, e.g., Michael Schill and Susan Wachter, The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law
and Policy: Concentrated Poverty in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1285, 1329-1333 (1995)
(discussing under-enforcement of federal antidiscrimination law and consequences for housing
segregation).
47/d. at 1329-33.
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housing goals with recognized rights to freedom of intimate association.
While it is one thing to require a person selling a home, or renting out
dozens of apartments in a large complex in which he or she does not
even live, to apply the most thoroughly non-discriminatory standards in
selecting buyers or tenants, it is quite another actually to require someone
to live in close quarters-in a home he or she owns, or an apartment he
or she rents-with a person with whom he or she does not feel
"comfortable," for almost any reason at all. 48 The relationship between
roommates or housemates is one more akin to a personal relationship like
friendship or dating. Overly stringent anti-discrimination laws in this
area therefore threaten to infringe upon rights of intimate association. 49
Although the exception is narrow, it covers very nearly the entire
clientele of Roommate.com. Moreover, the Internet is such an easy and
obvious way to exchange information about available housing, including
apartments, house-sharing, and so on, that it has quickly overtaken print
media even in local real estate markets. Why bother advertising in (or
reading) the classifieds of the local newspaper, when you can
instantaneously post information about a property (including pictures)
online, and housing seekers can search for an apartment by ZIP code and
all sorts of other criteria, with the touch of a button? Because the
Internet is such a perfect mechanism (or medium) for putting buyers and
sellers of all sorts of things together (think of eBay), it has rapidly
supplanted other forms of real estate advertising, particularly in the rental
48 Interestingly. we actually force college students to do this all the time - gender is the only
characteristic used for sorting, though even the purpose of that criterion (presumably, the protection
of modesty as well as a reduced risk either of a sexual relationship or of sexual predation) is
attenuated in a world with more and more persons who are "out" lesbian, gay, bisexual, or of nonstandard gender identification. New York University, for example, offers only "single-sexed" rooms
and suites, but, as their housing forms explain, "Room assignments are made by New York
University on the basis of the legal sex of the student, which is the sex assigned to the student at
birth. First-year students now have the option of requesting a room assignment based on gender
identity, which is the gender a student identifies with that may be different from the sex assigned to
that student at birth. This option would include gender identity male (GIM) and gender identity
female (GIF). If a student selects this option, we will seek to place the student in a room or suite
with others of the same gender identity who have requested a room assignment on this basis,
however, this placement is not guaranteed. If such housing is not possible, legal sex will be used in
determining housing placement." Informational letter from New York U. Department of Housing e)
(on file with author). In other words, a straight genetically-male student may find himself living
with another straight male, a gay male, a bisexual male, and maybe, a "gender identity female" male
- but under no circumstances, heaven forbid, with a girl (even one who is "gender identified" male).
49 See discussion in Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 133S, 134S (Colo. 1994), overruled on other
grounds by Romer v. Evans, SI7 U.S. 620 (1996). Similar issues are raised by the question ofraceor ethnicity-"matching" (or "preference") in the adoption context. For a critical discussion of this
issue, see Patricia 1. Williams, Spare Parts, Family Values, Old Children, Cheap, 28 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 913 (1994), reprinted in CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER lSI-58 (Adrien Wing ed.,
1997).
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market. Roommate.com itself has approximately 150,000 active listings
and has about a million page views per day.50
This makes the question of whether online publishers of housing
information must comply with § 3604(c) of the FHA-the central
question of Fair Housing Council v. Roommate.com - all the more
pressing. Given that the Internet has become the primary way people
search for (and advertise) housing, especially shared apartments and
roommate situations, if § 3604(c) does not apply to advertising in this
new medium, the provision has nearly been gutted.
Before turning to the interaction between § 3604( c) of the FHA and
the immunity provisions of the Communications Decency Act, it is
therefore worth pausing to remind ourselves of how anti-discrimination
policies and goals are furthered by § 3604(c), as distinct from § 3604(a),
(b), and (f). In general, civil rights statutes are to "be read expansively in
order to fulfill their purpose," and this principle has been applied to §
3604(c).51 In understanding why, we can identify at least four benefits to
prohibiting discrimination in advertising, even while supporting § 3603
(b)-type exemptions to § 3604(a), (b), and (f).52
A.

SECTION 3604(c) TURNS PUBUSHERS OF REAL ESTATE
ADVERTISING INTO LOW-COST EDUCATORS IN THE BROADER
EFFORT TO TEACH AMERICANS ABOUT THE SUBSTANTIVE NONDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS OF THE FHA

It is safe to assume that many persons seeking housing do not know
very much about the Fair Housing Act (or other civil rights laws that
protect them from discrimination in housing). Persons likely to be
discriminated against are also likely to be among the least
knowledgeable. The advertisements housing-seekers read therefore may
provide the only information they get about the permissible bases for
selecting tenants. Thus, if many advertisements contain discriminatory
qualifications, it would be easy and natural for housing seekers to assume
that all landlords are permitted to discriminate on those bases,
50 Fair Housing Council, No. CV 03-09386PA(RZK), 2004 WL 3799488, at *1 (C.D. Cal.
Sep. 30,2004).
51 See Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630, 635 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en bane) (Wright, J.,
concurring) (concluding that the court's interpretation of § 3604(c) would be broad, consistent with
the "well established" practice). In Mayers, Section 3604(c) was read broadly enough to prohibit the
Washington, D.C. Recorder of Deeds from recording any deeds that contained racially restrictive
covenants. [d.
52 See also Strahilevitz's discussion of "exclusionary vibes" and "exclusionary amenities."
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104 MICH. L. REv.
1835,1867-8,1886-1887,1886-87 (2006).
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squandering the opportunity for housing websites to contribute to
educating housing-seekers about their rights. 53
There is no reason to exempt Internet roommate-matching services
from having to bear the same costs that are borne by newspapers and
other publishers who decide to enter the real estate advertising market,
who must then police the contents of their real estate advertisements for
illegal content. The Internet permits the website operator to disseminate
much more information, at much lower cost, than a traditional
publisher. 54 It is not difficult to add a banner advertisement that contains
the substantive provisions of the FHA (including the exemptions, if
desired), nor is it burdensome to adapt the software questionnaire or
drop-down menus to seek only permissible information. In this way,
those who enjoy commercial benefits from bringing together housing
providers and housing seekers can cooperate to ensure that the antidiscrimination laws are not violated. 55
B.

NONDISCRIMINATORY ADVERTISING HELPS COUNTERACT IMPROPER
STEERING

According to the FHA, "It is the policy of the United States to
provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the
United States.,,56 One of the things this might mean is that everyone
should have access to those neighborhoods that are geographically
convenient and desirable, affordable, and so on, without fear of
discrimination. But it is also a premise of fair housing policy that more
diverse and integrated neighborhoods are not only an effect, but also a
cause, of a reduction in discrimination and racism (and other
objectionable "-isms") - that as people learn to live together, as
neighbors and fellow citizens, this will break down barriers, and people
who might have believed they could never get along, will learn to do so.
For that to happen, there needs to be maximum openness and access to
53 See Jennifer Chang, Note, In Search of Fair Housing in Cyberspace: The Implications of
The Communications Decency Actfor Fair Housing on the Internet, 55 STAN. L. REV. 969,975-76
(2002), for a similar argument.
54 To the extent that services like Roommate.com have become "crucial intermediaries" in
putting housing providers and seekers together, that only strengthens the claim for applying §
3604(c) to them, as was done with multiple listing services in Wheatley Heights Neighborhood
Coalition v. Jenna Resales Co., 447 F.Supp. 838, 840 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). See Chang, 55 STAN. L.
REV. at 980-81.
55 Colin Crawford, Cyperplace: Defining A Right To Internet Access Through Public
Accommodation WW, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 225 (2003), uses public accommodation law to understand
the role of the Internet and Internet actors in perpetuating or correcting discrimination, treating the
Internet as a "place."
56 42 U.S.C.A. § 3601 (Westlaw 2008).
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housing.
In surveying possible neighborhoods, the housing seeker is likely to
be sensitive to various cues. Rainbow flags in windows may send a
signal that gay people live here; small children playing in yards suggest
families; commercial establishments with signs in languages other than
English demonstrate the presence of those ethnic or national origin
communities; and so on.
By contrast, some property owners exude what Professor Lior
Stravilevitz of the University of Chicago calls an "exclusionary vibe."
An exclusionary vibes approach involves the landowner's
communication to potential entrants about the character of the
community's inhabitants. Such communication tells potential entrants
that certain people may not feel welcome if they enter the community
in question, because they will not share certain affinities with existing
or future residents. Although the landowner invokes no legal right to
exclude anyone from the property in question, an exclusionary vibe
may still be effective at excluding a targeted population thanks to two
mechanisms. First, a prospective entrant may view the exclusionary
vibe as an effective tool for creating a focal point around which people
can organize their affairs. A variation on this focal points effect arises
if the prospective entrant assumes that the exclusionary vibe will
create a community population that is likely to embrace bouncer's
exclusion at a later date as a means of removing the entrant from the
community. Second, the potential entrant may assume, incorrectly,
that the exclusionary vibe is backed by a bouncer's right to exclude
57
those who are not made to feel welcome by the exclusionary vibe.

The Fourth Circuit recognized this in the early days of the FHA.
According to U.S. v. Hunter, the Fair Housing Act prohibits
discriminatory advertising because:
[W]idespread appearance of discriminatory advertisements in public
or private media may reasonably be thought to have a harmful effect
on the general aims of the Act; seeing large numbers of 'white only'
advertisements in one part of a city may deter nonwhites from
venturing to seek homes there. 58

In the online environment, it is likely that housing seekers will use
particular neighborhoods (or ZIP codes) as search parameters, and if

57
58

Strahilevitz, 104 MICH. L. REv. at 1851 (citations omitted).
U.S. v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 214 (4th Cir. 1972). See also Chang, 55 STAN. L. REV at

974-75.
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many advertisements for housing in that area contain discriminatory
language about a group to which the housing seeker belongs, the seeker
may be dissuaded from even looking there (even if each ad with such
language, on closer inspection, turns out to be for a residence covered by
§ 3603(b». Discriminatory advertisements, whose cumulative message
is that persons in certain groups do not fit in or would not be welcome in
a neighborhood, are contrary to the goals of the FHA.
C.

REAL ESTATE ADVERTISING CONTRIDUTES TO THE GENERAL
ATMOSPHERE REGARDING THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF PERSONS IN
PROTECTED CATEGORIES

As alluded to above, even if only those roommate-seekers who
might permissibly discriminate in roommate-selection were allowed to
advertise their discriminatory preferences, it would be difficult for
housing-seekers and others to determine whether an apparently unlawful
ad fell within some exception or other. Instead, such advertisements
would create the impression that preferential treatment in housing
(whether on the basis of race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, family
status, or other categories) is not a form of illegal discrimination, which
in turn may undermine civil rights protections in other areas (such as
employment). (This is Strahilevitz's second mechanism by which an
exclusionary vibe excludes a targeted population.)59 Some commentators
have already drawn the connection between § 3604(c) and, for example,
sexual harassment. 60 Without the broad prohibitions of § 3604(c), what
entered the law as a narrowly-circumscribed exception (§ 3603(b»
would threaten to create a tacit permission to discriminate more
generally. Moreover, because of the efficiency gains implicit in greater
specification of possible roommates, a permission to engage in
discriminatory advertising amounts to an encouragement of it. If one has
discriminatory preferences, it would be "irrational" not to express them,
if one is permitted to do so. There is, therefore, every reason to believe
that the total volume of such advertisements would only rise (as the
expansion of the Internet roommate market has demonstrated).

See Strahilevitz, 104 MICH. L. REV. at 1851 (citations omitted).
See Robert G. Schwemm and Rigel C. Oliveri, A New Look at Sexual Harassment Under
the Fair Housing Act: The Forgotten Role of § 3604(c), 2002 WIS. L. REV. 771,786 (2002).
59

60
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DISCRIMINATORY HOUSING ADVERTISING AND/ As "HATE SPEECH"

The volume of online housing advertisements is most significant
because discriminatory online advertising, polluting cyberspace,61 can be
understood as a variety of "hate speech." Although the phrase "hate
speech" is more often associated with extreme actions like crossburning,62 or attempts to limit student speech,63 when the scope of the
Internet's reach is analyzed, and the aims of the FHA considered, a case
can be made for characterizing prohibited advertising as a form of hate
speech.
"Hate speech" has been variously defined, both by those who
support and by those who oppose its suppression. One First Amendment
treatise defines hate speech as "the generic term that has come to stand
for verbal attacks based on race, ethnicity, religion, and sexual
orientation or preference.,,64 More specifically, Frederick Schauer makes
the connection between such speech and discrimination by defining hate
speech as
Utterances intended to and likely to have the effect of inducing others
to commit... acts of unlawful discrimination based on the race,
religion, gender, or sexual orientation of the victim; and ... utterances
addressed to and intended to harm the listener (or viewer) because of
her race, religion, gender, or sexual orientation.65

Employing this definition, a discriminatory housing advertisement
qualifies as hate speech.66 If the housing in question is not covered by
the exemption, such an ad straightforwardly expresses an intention to
commit an act of unlawful discrimination on one or more of the
identified bases. But even if the particular space advertised is exempt,
the ad is likely to have the effect of inducing others, not aware of the
legal niceties of § 3603(b), to commit such acts with respect to non61 Schwemm makes a similar point: '''Congress takes very seriously people who publicly
announce that they will discriminate on race,' Schwemm says. 'We do not want people mucking up
the press with such ads.'" Stephanie Francis Ward, With Roomies-Be Careful How You Ask For
Them: 9th Circuit opinion applies fair housing rule on discrimination to Web site, ABA J. EREPORT, May 25, 2007.
62 See RAV. v. Sl. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 377-78, 393, 396 (1992).
63 See Harper v. Poway School District, 455 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2006) (order denying request
for rehearing en banc) (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
64 RODNEY A. SMOLLA & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF
SPEECH, § 12.2, at 12-2 (2007).
65 Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1321, 1349 (1992).

66 A similar idea is mentioned in Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the
Rights to Exclude, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1893 (2006).
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exempt properties. The ads are unquestionably "addressed to" certain
viewers, both those who do and those who do not belong to the
categories in question, and are intended to exclude and discourage some
of those viewers from seeking housing from that provider, which is
surely a harm to them.
Robert Post has identified three categories of harm from hate speech
relevant to discriminatory housing advertisements:

(1) "Deontic" Harm.... is an elemental wrongness to racist
expression, regardless of the presence or absence of particular
empirical consequences.... A society committed to the ideals of
social and political equality cannot remain passive, and must issue
unequivocal expressions of solidarity with vulnerable minority groups
and make positive statements affirming its commitment to those
ideals.
(2) Harms to Identifiable Groups. Racist expression harms those
groups that are the target of the expression .... [S]peech likely to cast
contempt or ridicule on identifiable groups ought to be regulated to
prevent injury to the status and prospects of the members of those
groups ....
(3) Harm to Individuals. Racist expression, like defamation, invasion
of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, harms
individuals. These injuries include feelings of humiliation, isolation,
and self-hatred, as well as dignitary affront. ... 67

A number of scholars, particularly critical race theorists such as
Mari Matsuda, Patricia Williams, and Richard Delgado, have expanded
further on the various psychological and even physical harms of such
speech. 68 While discriminatory ads are not generally among the most
virulent examples of hate speech (though there is nothing to prevent ads
from containing extremely offensive epithets referring to membership in
protected categories,69 and "contempt and ridicule" are commonplace),
the statements are made in public, intensifying them. As Delgado notes,
"mere words, whether racial or otherwise, can cause mental, emotional,
67 Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy. and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 267, 271-277 (1991) (quoted in Ronald Turner, Regulating Hate Speech and the First
Amendment: The Attractions of, and Objections To, An Explicit Harms-Based Analysis, 29 IND. L.
REV. 257, 295 (1995) (citations and quotation marks omitted».
68 See Turner, 29 IND. L. REV. at 296-98 and sources cited therein.
ff} ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 42
(1992) (discussing "nigger," as well as "slut," "fag," and "cripple").
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or even physical harm to their target, especially if delivered in front of
others or by a person in a position of authority.,,7o A web-posted housing
ad can be seen by millions, and appears with the implicit approval of the
website operator. The law recognizes that the target of discriminatory
speech suffers harms distinct from the harms of the discriminatory act
contemplated or described. 71 A sign saying " _ go home" inflicts a
dignitary injury on the persons in the group to whom it is directed, quite
separable from whatever injury any particular group member suffers by
actual exclusion. Every person of color who ever walked by a restaurant,
motel, restroom, or water fountain with a sign reading "WHITES
ONL y" was damaged by that experience - even if he or she had no
occasion to enter the restaurant, motel, or restroom, or drink from the
fountain - and hence never discovered if the sign would be enforced or
ignored. If most or all of the housing ads in the paper explicitly sought
"white" "Christian" tenants or roommates, or said "no gays, blacks, or
Jews," the environment created thereby, of separatism and antagonism,
would be inimical to the goals of the Fair Housing Act. The use of
discriminatory language, and even images, in advertising, contributes to
a broader sense of inclusion or exclusion, of being a valued participant or
a marginalized outsider, in the community. Where one may safely live,
and raise a family, is at the core of that experience of citizenship.72

II.

COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT IMMUNITY: THE PURPOSES AND
LIMITATIONS OF § 230

The basic immunity involved is set forth with classic simplicity in
47 U.S.C § 230(c)(l): "No provider ... of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.,,73 Under this section,
an interactive computer service provider will not be liable when
transmitting content it would otherwise be unlawful to "publish."
According to the Ninth Circuit, ''The touchstone of section 230( c) is that
providers of interactive computer services are immune from liability for

70 Richard Delgado. Words That Wound: A Tort Action For Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 143 (1982) (emphasis added).
71 See generally Turner, 29 IND. L. REv. at 292-302 and sources cited therein.
72 A perhaps less extreme version of the same argument is that a ban on discriminatory
advertising reduces or eliminates the harm of "stigma" associated with encountering such ads. See,
e.g., Jennifer Chang, Note, In Search of Fair Housing in Cyberspace: The Implications of The
Communications Decency Act for Fair Housing on the Internet, 55 STAN. L. REV. 969, 975-76
(2002).
73
47 U.S.C.A. § 230(c) (Westlaw 2008).
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content created by third parties.,,74 The immunity applies to a defendant
who is the "provider ... of an interactive computer service" and is being
sued "as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by"
someone else. 75
Where did this provision come from? Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v.
Prodigy Services Co., decided in 1995, was an important impetus for §
230(c).76 In Stratton, a New York state court had held that Prodigy, an
interactive service provider, was a "publisher" of allegedly libelous or
defamatory statements, not a "distributor," and hence potentially liable. 77
In reaching this conclusion, the Stratton court employed a familiar
distinction between publishers and distributors:
[O]ne who repeats or otherwise republishes a libel is subject to
liability as if he had originally published it. In contrast, distributors
such as book stores and libraries may be liable for defamatory
statements of others only if they knew or had reason to know of the
defamatory statement at issue. A distributor, or deliverer of
defamatory material is considered a passive conduit and will not be
found liable in the absence of fault. 78
In Stratton, the court determined that Prodigy was a "publisher," in
essence because it exercised editorial control over content:
PRODIGY held itself out to the public and its members as controlling
the content of its computer bulletin boards. Second, PRODIGY
implemented this control through its automatic software screening
program, and the Guidelines which Board Leaders are required to
enforce. By actively utilizing technology and manpower to delete
notes from its computer bulletin boards on the basis of offensiveness
and "bad taste", [sic] for example, PRODIGY is clearly making
decisions as to content, and such decisions constitute editorial control.
That such control is not complete and is enforced both as early as the
notes arrive and as late as a complaint is made, does not minimize or
eviscerate the simple fact that PRODIGY has uniquely arrogated to
itself the role of determining what is proper for its members to post
and read on its bulletin boards. Based on the foregoing, this Court is
compelled to conclude that for the purposes of Plaintiffs' claims in
Roommates.com I, 489 F.3d 921,925 (9th Cir. 2005).
47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
76
1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup, May 24,1995). See also Roommate.com II, 521 F.3d 1157,
1163 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).("Section 230 was prompted by a state court case holding Prodigy
responsible for a libelous message posted on one of its financial message boards").
77 Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *4.
78 1d. at *3 (internal citations omitted).
74

75

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2008

21

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 2

350

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
this action, PRODIGY is a publisher rather than a distributor.

[Vol. 38

79

As enacted, the federal Communications Decency Act of 1996
(CDA) had two purposes: (1) to protect children from indecency on the
Internet, and (2) to foster growth of the Internet. 80 As the Ninth Circuit
explained,
Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, is known as the
"Communications Decency Act of 1996." The primary goal of the Act
was to control the exposure of minors to indecent material. Parts of the
Act have since been struck down as unconstitutional limitations on
81
free speech, but the section at issue here, § 230, remains intact.

Beyond child protection, the secondary purpose of the immunity
provisions codified at § 230 is to "preserve the vibrant and competitive
free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulations.,,82
The intent of this section was to prevent computer service
provider liability for common law speech-based torts (such as
defamation) arising from material disseminated online. These torts
frequently provide for both "speaker" and "publisher" liability, and it is
the latter that is at issue here. 83 On the one hand, ISPs did not want to
run the risk of being held legally responsible for the content of the
millions, or even billions, of messages posted and sent online. At the
same time, perhaps paradoxically, after Stratton, some providers were
concerned that by exercising any editorial control over content, they
might subject themselves to liability for unlawful communications that
somehow "got through." Rather than foregoing all control over content
whatsoever, computer service providers were able to get an immunity
provision added to the CDA, thereby actually encouraging the exercise
of editorial control over content (a.k.a. censorship) without fear of
liability.84 As the Ninth Circuit later emphasized, "Congress sought to
Id. at *4 (citations omitted).
80 Marsha Cope Huie, et al., The Right To Privacy in Personal Data: The EU Prods the U.S.
and Controversy Continues, 9 TULSA J. COMPo & INT'LL. 391,415 (2002).
81 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 10 18, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations deleted).
82
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2).
83 See, e.g., M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, liability of Publisher of Defamatory Statement for
its Repetition or Republication by Others," 96 A.L.R.2d 373 (Westlaw 2007).
84 A detailed legislative history is provided in Jennifer Chang, Note, In Search of Fair
Housing in Cyberspace: The Implications of The Communications Decency Act for Fair Housing on
the Internet, 55 STAN. L. REv. 969, 988-94, 1002-03 (2002), including fair housing-related
legislation that was before Congress at the same time the CDA was enacted. Chang argues that this
shows that "Had [Congress] desired to immunize [online service providers] from fair housing
79
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immunize the removal of user-generated content, not the creation of
content. ,,85
Hence, the CDA crucially distinguishes between "mere" publishers,
who enjoy immunity, and "information content providers," who (like
speakers) do not. An information content provider is "any person or
entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet.,,86 Since the
fIrst version of the CDA was enacted in 1996,87 a series of cases have
defIned the difference between "interactive computer service providers"
and "information content providers," for purposes of evaluating
publisher liability in various contexts.
A 1997 Fourth Circuit case, Zeran v. American Online, Inc., 88
articulated how§ 230(c) immunity relates to free speech on the Internet.
Congress recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to
freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium. The
impOSition of tort liability on service providers for the
communications of others represented, for Congress, simply another
form of intrusive government regulation of speech. Section 230 was
enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of Internet
communication and, accordingly, to keep government interference in
the medium to a minimum....
. . . Congress made a policy choice, however, not to deter harmful
online speech through the separate route of imposing tort liability on
companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties' potentially
injurious messages.

liability, it would be reasonable to expect that at least some members would have identified or
discussed the issue at some point in the legislative history of § 230." Id. at 1003. One might equally
argue, however, that had they intended not to provide immunity for discriminatory housing
advertisements, it would be reasonable to expect that at least some members would have identified
or discussed the issue. Such are the hazards of relying too heavily on silent legislative history to
determine the intent of a statute.
85 Roommate.com II, 521 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2008) (en bane).
86 47 U.S.C. § 230(0(3). The balance of § 230 is intended to preclude regulation of Internet
service providers ("ISPs"), encourage the development of screening technology, and protect ISPs
that employ filtering devices to detect and screen child pornography.
87 The Communications Decency Act was enacted as Title V of The Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
88 Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330-331 (4th Cir. 1997). The case is also
analyzed in Jennifer Chang, Note, In Search of Fair Housing in Cyberspace: The Implications of
The Communications Decency Act for Fair Housing on the Internet, 55 STAN. L. REv. 969, 994-99
(2002).
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Congress' purpose in providing the § 230 immunity was thus evident.
Interactive computer services have millions of users. The amount of
information communicated via interactive computer services is
therefore staggering. The specter of tort liability in an area of such
prolific speech would have an obvious chilling effect. It would be
impossible for service providers to screen each of their millions of
postings for possible problems. Faced with potential liability for each
message republished by their services, interactive computer service
providers might choose to severely restrict the number and type of
messages posted. Congress considered the weight of the speech
interests implicated and chose to immunize service providers to avoid
any such restrictive effect. 89

Zeran gave § 230(c) a broad and forceful interpretation, which has been
widely followed nationwide ever since. 90
Zeran involved a suit against America Online ("AOL") for
unreasonably delaying the removal of messages defaming the plaintiff
repeatedly posted on the website. In finding AOL immune, the Zeran
court employed the traditional distinction between "publisher" and
"distributor" with respect to the tort of defamation. 91 Under Zeran, the
"plain language" of § 230 intended to exempt an ISP even if it exercised
"a publisher's traditional editorial functions-such as deciding whether to
publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content. ... ,,92 The court held that
the "plain language,,93 of the statute "create[ d] a federal immunity to any

89 Zemn, 129 F.3d at 330-331. Zemn addressed §230 as it appeared in the Communications
Decency Act of 1996. The portions of that statute intended to protect minors from indecent material
were declared unconstitutional in Reno v. A.C.L.U., 521 U.S. 844 (1997), but §230 remained
unscathed.
90 As the Ninth Circuit stated (through a panel consisting of Judges Reinhardt and Kozinski,
along with the author of the opinion, Judge Milan Smith), "The majority of federal circuits have
interpreted the CDA to establish broad 'federal immunity to any cause of action that would make
service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service. '" Perfect
10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Zemn, 129 F.3d at 331)). In Perfect 10, the Ninth
Circuit also referred to Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003),
which in turned cited Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2003). ld. A California
Supreme Court defamation case similarly followed Zemn. See Barret v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510,
514 (Cal. 2006).
91 ld. at 332. See also Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710 at
*3 (N.Y.Sup, May 24,1995), and cases cited therein.
92 Zemn, 129 F.3d at 330. A useful summary of the relevant cases following Zemn is found
in Jeffrey M. Sussman, Cyberspace: An Emerging Safe Haven For Housing Discrimination, 19 Loy.
CONSUMER L. REV. 194, 203-07 (2007).
93 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
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cause of action that would make service providers liable for information
originating with a third-party user of the service.,,94
III. FHA v. CDA; WHEN Is A "PROVIDER OF INTERACTNE COMPUTER
SERVICES" WHO ADVERTISES ROOMS FOR RENT ALso AN
"INFORMATION CONTENT PROVIDER" OF HOUSING INFORMATION?

Those who provide homes to others have a crucial role to play in
carrying out the goals of the Fair Housing Act, and its broad prohibition
on discriminatory advertising is central to that role. Courts have rightly
rejected all attempts to expand the narrow exception to its nondiscriminatory mandate, justified by the freedom of intimate association.
Thus, § 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act has been applied to a very wide
variety of media, including "newspapers, multiple listing services,
telecommunications devices for the deaf, a housing complex's 'pool and
building rules,' as well as 'any other publishing medium.",95 The U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") "has issued a
regulation construing Section 3604(c) as applying to '[w]ritten notices
and statements includ[ing] any applications, flyers, brochures, deeds,
signs, banners, posters, billboards or any documents used with respect to
the sale or rental of a dwelling. ",96 But does it apply to those who
publish housing advertisements on the Internet, like craigslist, or to an
"online roommate-matching website,,97 like Roommate.com? Or does
the immunity offered to interactive computer service providers by the
Communications Decency Act provide a shield? That is the question
presented by two cases decided by federal Circuit Courts of Appeal in
the spring of 2008, Chicago Lawyers' Committee For Civil Rights Under
the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., in the Seventh Circuit, and Fair Housing
Council v. Roommate. com, in the Ninth Circuit. 98 Their differing
ld .
95 Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.
(Chicago Lawyers' Committee), 461 F. Supp. 2d 681, 687 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (directing the reader to
see Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d. 995,999-1000 (2nd Cir. 1991) (newspapers); Saunders v.
Gen. Servs. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1042, 1057-59 (E.D.Va. 1987); Wheatley Heights Neighborhood
Coalition v. Jenna Resales Co., 447 F. Supp. 838, 842 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (multiple listing
services); telecommunication devices for the deaf, U.S. v. Space Hunters, Inc., 429 F.3d 416, 420
(2d Cir. 2005) (telecommunication devices for the deaf); Fair Hous. Congo v. Weber, 993 F. Supp.
1286,1289-91 (C.D.Cal. 1997) (a housing complex's "pool and building rules"); U.S. V. Hunter, 459
F.2d 205, 211 (4th Cir. 1972) ("as well as 'any other publishing medium"')).
96 Chicago Lawyers' Committee. 461 F. Supp. 2d at 687 (citing 24 C.F.R. § 100.75).
97 Roommates.com 1,489 F.3d at 924.
98 Scholarship has been largely pessimistic. See. e.g., Censorship by Proxy: The First
Amendment. Internet Intermediaries. and the Problem of the Weakest link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. II,
96 n.274 (2006) ("Courts have read the protection against liability for content provided by others to
94
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answers may create a question suitable for decision by the U.S. Supreme
Court in the not-too-distant future.
A.

CHICAGO LA WYERS' COMMIITEE V. CRAlGSUST

In Chicago Lawyers' Committee For Civil Rights Under the Law,
Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., a fair housing group attacked craigslist99 based on
the content of housing advertisements posted on the site. loo The
plaintiffs argued that the publication of this information, detailing
preferences as to race, sex, religion and familial status, violated the fair
housing laws. 101 One commentator characterized this case as raising the
issue of "whether online classified ad venues must comply with the Fair
Housing ACt."I02 An Illinois federal district court held the claim barred
by the CDA, stating that, "Near-unanimous case law holds that Section
230(a) affords immunity to ICSs· against suits that seek to hold an ICS
liable for third-party content." 103 The court cited Zeran as "the
fountainhead of this uniform authority."I04 Mter considering arguments
based on the "publisher or speaker" language of the statute, the court
found the statute's language to govern. 105Whiie the Zeran court held that
§ 230' s "plain language" "created a federal immunity to any cause of
preempt virtually every other cause of action. E.g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d
1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) (invasion of privacy; negligence); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1118-19 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (Consumer Protection Act, Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 19.86.010-920 (West 1999), and tortious interference with business relationships); Fair
Housing Council, No. CV 03-09386 PA(RZX), 2004 WL 3799488,at *8-9 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30,
2004) (Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2000); Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261
F.Supp. 2d 532, 540-41 (E.D. Va. 2003) (Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.c. § 2000a
(2000)."); Jeffrey M. Sussman, Cyberspace: An Emerging Safe Haven For Housing Discrimination,
19 Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 194,214-18 (2007). But see Jennifer Chang, Note, In Search of Fair
Housing in Cyberspace: The Implications of The Communications Decency Actfor Fair Housing on
the Internet, 55 STAN. L. REV. 969, 969 (2002).
99 The entity does not capitalize its name.
100 461 F. Supp. 2d 681 (N.D. III. 2006).
101 Id. at 682.
102 Ronald J. Mann, Emerging Frameworks for Policing Internet Intermediaries, 10 1.
INTERNET L., Dec. 2006, at 3, 8 (December 2006).
103 Chicago Lawyer's Committee, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 688.
104

/d.

105 Id. at 698. The plaintiff s citation of the federal Department of Housing and Urban
Development's position that the CDA did not bar claims under the FHA was found to be
"unpersuasive," and not entitled to Chevron deference. Id. at 692 n.9. In reviewing administrative
interpretations of statutes, courts look first to the principles set forth in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The first step under Chevron is to
determine whether the statutory meaning is unambiguous. /d. at 843. No deference to the view of
the administrative agency is necessary when "normal principles of statutory construction suffice" to
determine the statute's meaning. See, e.g., Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 783, 786 (9th Cir.
2004) (citations omitted).
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action that would make service providers liable for information
originating with a third party user of the service," 106 the Craigslist district
court took a somewhat different approach, reading § 230 as prohibiting
"publisher" treatment of an interactive computer service provider, in turn
making it impossible to state any claim that required proving that the
interactive computer service "published" any content. 107
At the district court level, the amici also raised a First Amendment
issue, citing Smith v. Calijornia lO8 and using the traditional
publisher/distributor distinction to argue,
As a matter of the First Amendment, an entity that serves as an
intermediary for large quantities of third-party content - whether it be
a bookstore, a library, or the provider of an online forum - cannot be
held liable for unlawful content that may be interspersed among the
overall body of information being disseminated absent evidence that it
knew or should have known of that content. 109

The case was appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which affIrmed, in a
relatively brief opinion authored by Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook. 110
(The case was decided just three weeks before the Ninth Circuit filed its
en bane opinion.) As the Seventh Circuit understood the issue, "[t]he
question is not whether Congress gave any thought to the Fair Housing
Act [in enacting the Communications Decency Act], but whether it
excluded § 3604(c) from the reach of § 230 (C)(l).,,111 According to the
Seventh Circuit, "[w]hat § 230(c)(1) says is that an online information
system must not 'be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by' someone else,,,112 and thus cannot be liable
under § 3604(c).113 As Easterbrook put it, craigslist "is not the author of
Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
107 Chicago Lawyer's Committee, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 696. This decision is also discussed in
Jeffrey P. Cunard and Jennifer B. Coplan, Cyberliability 2006: Select Developments,
COMMUNICATIONS LAW 2006 51, 75 (Practicing Law Institute 2006); Evan Brown, Internet Law in
the Courts, II J. INTERNET L., Jan. 2007, at 16, 17; Leslie Paul Machado, Immunity Under § 230 Of
The Communications Decency Act of 1996: A Short Primer, to J. INTERNET L., Sep. 2006, at 8, 9;
Jeffrey M. Sussman, Cyberspace: An Emerging Safe Haven For Housing Discrimination, 19 Loy.
CONSUMER L. REV. 194,211·14 (2007).
lOS Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-153 (1959).
109 Brief for Amazon.com, Inc., et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Craigslist's Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings, Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v.
Craigslist, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 681 (N.D. III. 2006) (No. 06 C 0657), 2006 WL 1794487 at n.4.
110 Chicago Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.
(Craigslist), 519 F.3d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 2008).
III/d. at 671.
112
Id.
113 Id .
106
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the ads and could not be treated as the 'speaker' of the posters'
words.,,114 The Seventh Circuit also rejected the argument that craigslist
"can be liable as one who 'cause[d] to be made, printed or published any
[discriminatory] notice, statement, or advertisement, ",115 because
Craigslist's role is too passive to satisfy causation. "An interactive
computer service 'causes' postings only in the sense of providing a place
where people can post. Nothing in the service craigslist offers induces
anyone to post any particular listing or express a preference for
discrimination." 116 The Seventh Circuit concluded that, "given §
230(c)(1) [the Lawyers' Committee] cannot sue the messenger just
because the message reveals a third party's plan to engage in unlawful
discrimination." 117
B.

FAIR HOUSING COUNCIL V. ROOMMATE. COM .

Although Craigslist was decided by the Seventh Circuit a few
weeks before the Ninth Circuit en banc panel decided Roommate.com II,
when the California federal district court heard Fair Housing Council, it
was "the first case to address the relationship between the CDA's grant
of immunity and the FHA's imposition of liability for the making or
publishing of discriminatory real estate listings.,,118 Until that time,
although the Ninth Circuit had a reasonably well-developed body of law
on § 230(c), no case had yet had to balance the policies behind § 230(c)
against the FHA, an important piece of civil rights legislation which
expressly and purposefully created publisher liability."9

Id.
115 Id . at 671-72.
116 Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 671.
117 Id. at 672.
118 Fair Housing Council, No. CV 03-09386PA(RZK), 2004 WL 3799488, at *3 (CD. Cal.
Sep. 30, 2004). Chicago Lawyers' Committee, 461 F. Supp. 2d 681 (N.D. Ill. 2006), was decided
between the district court decision and the Ninth Circuit appeal.
119 In this way, Roommate II is distinguishable from Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261
F.Supp.2d 532 (E.D.Va. 2003), affd, 2004 WL 602711 (4th CiT. 2004) (per curiam), which found §
230 immunity for an alleged violation of Title II. Still, the Eastern District of Virginia federal
district court, in dicta, remarked, "the exclusion of federal criminal claims, but not federal civil
rights claims, clearly indicates, under the canon of expressio unius est exclusion alterius, that
Congress did not intend to place federal civil rights claims outside the scope of § 230 immunity," Id.
at 539, leading at least one commentator to conclude, "This case suggests a bleak outcome in a case
where the Fair Housing Act, under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, confronts § 230
immunity."
Jeffrey M. Sussman, Cyberspace: An Emerging Safe Haven For Housing
Discrimination, 19 loY. CONSUMER L. REV. 194, 206 (2007). Student Sussman may have
overestimated the degree of deference likely to be shown to such an opinion by the Ninth Circuit.
114
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Background: § 230 In The Ninth Circuit

Two cases decided by the Ninth Circuit in 2003 form the backdrop
for the Ninth Circuit's analysis of § 230(c) immunity. In its en banc
opinion in Roommate.com II, the Ninth Circuit revisited and clarified its
holding in each of them.
a.

Batzel v. Smith

In Batzel v. Smith,120 the Ninth Circuit considered the applicability
of § 230(c) to Ton Cremers, the "moderator of a listserv and operator of
a website," who disseminated an email message he received from Bob
Smith, containing allegedly defamatory information about Smith's
former employer, Ellen Batzel. 121 Batzel had employed Smith as a
handyman. While working at her home, statements Batzel made to
Smith, and observations Smith made, led him to believe that some
paintings in her home were looted Nazi art. 122 Smith sent an email to
Cremers, at an email address Cremers maintained as the sole operator of
the nonprofit "Museum Security Network," communicating this.
Cremers, who received many messages relating to stolen art at the
Network, posted Smith's message to the listserv he moderated, although
Smith had not intended for that to happen, and had not sent his email to
the address dedicated to that purpose. 123 Batzel sued. 124
The district court held that Cremers (and the Museum Security
Network) was not an "Internet service provider" entitled to immunity
under § 230(c).125 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, and found Cremers
immune from any speech-based tort. As the Court stated,
There is no reason inherent in the technological features of cyberspace
why First Amendment and defamation law should apply differently in
cyberspace than in the brick and mortar world. Congress, however,
has chosen for policy reasons to immunize from liability for
defamatory or obscene speech "providers and users of interactive
computer services" when the defamatory or obscene material is
"provided" by someone else. This case presents the question whether
and, if so, under what circumstances a moderator of a listserv and

333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003).
ld. at 1020-21.
122
ld .

120
121

123/d.

at 1022.

124

ld .

125

ld. at 1026.
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operator of a website who posts an allegedly defamatory e-mail
authored by a third party can be held liable for doing SO.126
While the Batzel court understood § 230(c) broadly with respect to
publishers, it applied the section narrowly with respect to the causes of
action to which immunity applied. The Ninth Circuit apparently
interpreted § 230(c) to provide immunity for "defamatory or obscene
speech," nothing more. Despite the breadth of its holding, therefore,
nothing in Batzel even hinted that online publishers should be immune
from suit under the Fair Housing Act.
(In Roommate.com II, the Ninth Circuit put a somewhat different
spin on Batzel, to harmonize the earlier case with Roommate.com II.
This analysis focused on whether the material was sent to Cremers "for
posting online," leaving Cremers "to determine whether or not to prevent
its posting," in which case Cremers would be entitled to immunity under
§ 230, or whether Cremers "publishe[d] material that he [did] not believe
was tendered to him for posting online, [so that] he [was] the one making
the affirmative decision to publish," in which case he would be "properly
deemed a developer and not entitled to CDA immunity.,,127)
b.

Carafano v. Metrosplash.com

The leading Ninth Circuit case distinguishing "interactive computer
service providers" from "information content providers" in relation to §
230(c) is Carajano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc.,l28 decided, like Batzel, in
2003. Carafano addressed Matchmaker.com's liability for false and
defamatory postings on an Internet dating site. The Ninth Circuit held
that Matchmaker.com was not an information content provider, and
hence was immune under § 230(c).129 Like Roommate. com, the
Matchmaker site used both multiple-choice and essay sections. 130 In
Carafano, "an unidentified prankster placed a fraudulent personal ad,"
containing allegedly defamatory content about the sexual interests of a
user. 131 Carafano sued Matchmaker.

Batzel, 339 F.3d at 1020.
127 Roommate.com II, 521 F.3d 1157, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
128 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).
129 1d. at 1124-25.
130 Id. at 1121.
126

131 Roommates.com I, 489 F.3d 921, 927 (9th Cir. 2007). That user, Christianne Carafano, is
an actress who was a member of the cast of Star Trek: Deep Space Nine, under the stage name
"Chase Masterson." Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1121.
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The Roommates.com I Ninth Circuit opinion identified two reasons
why the Ninth Circuit found Matchmaker immune: Matchmaker "merely
'facilitated the expression of information by individual users, ",132 in
other words, '''no profile ha[d] any content until a user actively create[d]
it. ",133 Neither the multiple-choice questions with pre-set answer
choices, nor the essay questions, negated that. 134 But secondly, "even if
[Matchmaker] could be considered a content provider for publishing its
customers' profiles, it was exempt from liability because it did not
'create[ ] or develop[ ] the particular information at issue. ",135 The
information entered by the "prankster" was "transmitted unaltered to
profile viewers.,,136 Matchmaker "was not a content provider of the
offending information because it did not play a significant role in
creating, developing or transforming it.,,137 It was, "with respect to the
defamatory content. .. merely a passive conduit and thus could not be
liable for failing to detect and remove it.,,138 (The similarity between
Matchmaker and craigslist is clear.)
At least two issues remained undecided after both Batzel and
Carafano: first, whether the Ninth Circuit would find that § 230(c)
immunity applied in contexts other than the speech torts (libel,
defamation); and second, whether Roommate.com's conduct as a website
operator was sufficiently distinguishable from that of Matchmaker.com
to take it outside the scope of immunity established by Carafano.
Whether Roommate.com, unlike Matchmaker, was a "creator" or
"developer" of the potentially discriminatory content would prove to be
the central issue in the Roommate. com II decision.

Roommates.com I, 489 F.3d at 927 (citing Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124-25).
Roommates.com I, 489 F.3d at 927 (citing Carafano.339 F.3d at 1124). The Ninth Circuit
en banc opinion concedes that the language of Carafano "was unduly broad." Roommate.com II, 521
F.3d 1157, 1171 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Specifically, the Ninth Circuit retracts the claim that the
website is immune for the reason given above. As the Ninth Circuit explains in Roommate.com II,
"even if the data are supplied by third parties, a website operator may still contribute to the content's
illegality and thus be liable as a developer." Id.
134 Roommates.com I, 489 F.3d at 927 (citing Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124).
135 Roommates.com I, 489 F.3d at 928 (citing Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1125).
136 Roommates.com I, 489 F.3d at 928 (citing Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1125).
137 Roommates.com I, 489 F.3d at 928 (citing Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1125) (quotation marks
omitted). In the Ninth Circuit en banc opinion in Roommate.com II, the court goes even further, and
states that the "allegedly libelous content there - the false implication that Carafano was unchaste was created and developed entirely by the malevolent user, without prompting or help from the
website operator." Roommate.com II, 521 F.3d at 1171 (emphasis added). Furthermore,
Matchmaker.com "did absolutely nothing to enhance the defamatory sting of the message, to
encourage defamation or to make defamation easier." Id.
138 Roommate.com II, 521 F.3d at 1172.
132
133
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The District Court: Total Immunity

The district court provided a good overview of how Roommate.com
does business before proceeding to its legal analysis. Because details
matter, it is quoted here at length.
Roommate owns and operates www.roommates.com.anInternet
website which provides a roommate locator service for individuals
who have residences to share or rent out, and individuals looking for
residences to share. The website allows those with residences, and
those looking for residences, to post information about themselves and
available housing options on a searchable database. Basic membership
is free and allows a user to create a personal profile, conduct searches
of the database, and send "roommail"-a type of internal e-mail
system-to other users. Paid memberships allow users to view the
free-form essay "comments" posted by other users, view full-size
photos, and receive roommail from other users. Roommates.com [sic]
currently receives over 50,000 visits and 1,000,000 page views per
day. Approximately 40,000 users are offering rooms for rent, 110,000
users are looking for a residence to share, and 24,000 users have paid
for upgraded memberships.
To become a member of Roommate's service, a person must author a
personal profile. The profile includes information, much of which is
entered by selecting from among a number of predetermined options
provided by Roommate, concerning, among other things, the person's
age, gender, sexual orientation, occupation, and number of children. A
user must provide a response for each inquiry. Roommate's
questionnaire makes no inquiries concerning a user's race or religion.
Users create their own nicknames, can attach photographs, and may
add a free-form essay to personalize the entry by describing
themselves and their roommate preferences. When listing a room for
rent, the user responds to prompts which result in the posting of
specific details about the area, rent and deposit information, date of
availability, and features of the residence. Information may also be
posted about the current occupants of the household and roommate
preferences for the incoming roommate. In addition to admittedly nondiscriminatory information such as cleanliness, smoking habits, and
pet ownership, these preferences can, when selected, include the user's
responses to Roommate's questions about age, gender, sexual
orientation, occupation, and familial status. 139

139 Fair Housing Council, No. CV 03-09386PA(RZK), 2004 WL 3799488, at *1 (C.D. Cal.
Sep. 30, 2004).
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The Ninth Circuit later emphasized that Roommate.com required
each subscriber "to disclose his sex, sexual orientation and whether he
would bring children to a household" and "also describe his preferences
in roommates with respect to the same three criteria: sex, sexual
orientation and whether they will bring children to the household." 140
At a glance, it might appear that the publication of some of this
content, after its creation by the user, would violate § 3604(c) of the
FHA. Thirty-five years ago, the Fourth Circuit held that newspapers
may constitutionally be enjoined from publishing discriminatory rental
real estate advertisements. 141 Three years ago, in Space Hunters, Inc.,
the Second Circuit held a housing information vendor liable for
violations of the FHA, including § 3604(c), notwithstanding that the
rooms in question were covered by the § 3603(b) exemption from the
substantive antidiscrimination provisions of § 3604(a) and (b).142 Like
the newspaper, Roommate.com disseminates information provided by
housing vendors seeking tenants. The all-important difference, of
course, is that Roommate.com provides its services via the Internet, and
thus claimed to enjoy immunity as an interactive computer service
provider.
Before the federal district court for the Central District of
California, Roommate.com, represented by the same counsel that had
successfully represented Matchmaker.com in Carajano,143 prevailed in
convincing Judge Percy Anderson that the immunity provision covered
the business model of Roommate. com. The district court used three
overlapping arguments. First, the district court relied on the absence of
evidence of any legislative intent to exempt the FHA in general from the
immunity provision of the CDA. "The CDA clarifies its effect on other
laws and specifically exempts federal criminal laws, laws pertaining to
intellectual property, and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986," but not the Fair Housing Act. 144 Employing the maxim expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, the district court concluded that the immunity
provision applied. 145
Roommate.com II, 521 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
A court may constitutionally enjoin a newspaper's printing of classified advertisements
which violate [§ 804(c)]; such subsection does not contravene the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution either. See U.S. v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 213-15 (4th Cir.
1972).
142 U.S. v. Space Hunters, Inc., 429 F.3d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 2005).
143 Stephanie Francis Ward, With Roomies-Be Careful How You Ask For Them: 9th Circuit
opinion applies/air housing rule on discrimination to Web site, ABA 1. E-REPORT, May 25, 2007.
144 Fair Housing Council, 2004 WL 3799488, at *3 (citing 47 U.S.c. § 230(e».
145 This maxim is embodied in U.S. law in the principle that "[w]here Congress explicitly
enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in
140

141
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Second, the district court followed Carajana's interpretation of the
distinction between interactive computer service providers and
information content providers, and saw no meaningful distinction
between Matchmaker.com's practices and those of Roommate. com. 146
Both websites asked members to answer multiple-choice questions and
write free-form essays, and then created profiles consisting of this
information.
The Ninth Circuit did not hold Matchmaker.com
"responsible, even in part," for the content, because it came from
users.147 The same, thought the district court, went for Roommate.com.
Finally, the district court was unmoved by the Fair Housing
Council's policy argument: "a concern that application of the CDA might
eviscerate the FHA.,,148 Notwithstanding its acknowledgement that
Roommate.com receives "over 50,000 visits and 1,000,000 page views
per day,,,149 the district court conceded only that "the most that can be
said is that operators of Internet sites such as Roommate have an
advantage over traditional print media because websites, unlike
newspapers, are exempt from 42 U.S.C. section 3604(c) and the related
state fair housing laws for publishers.,,15o This of course effectively
grants FHC's argument - the "advantage" offered by Internet publication
is so substantial that if it is beyond the FHA's reach, § 3604(c) is a dead
letter, primarily (apparently) because Congress did not see fit to exempt
it explicitly from § 230(c).151 Relying on two cases exempting Internet
publishers from liability for defamation and obscenity, the district court
reiterated that "Congress has chosen to treat cyberspace differently" than
"other information providers such as newspapers, magazines or
television and radio stations, all of which may be held liable for

the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent." Fair Housing Council. 2004 WL 3799488,
at *3 (citing Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980». The district court
reasoning here parallelled that of the Eastern District of Virginia in Noah v. AOL Time Warner
Inc., 261 F.Supp. 2d 532, 537-39 (E.D. Va. 2003).
146 Fair Housing Council, 2004 WL 3799488, at *4.
147 Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003).
148 Fair Housing Council, 2004 WL 3799488, at *4. Chang also used the term "eviscerate." ,
Jennifer Chang, Note, In Search of Fair Housing in Cyberspace: The Implications of The
Communications Decency Actfor Fair Housing on the Internet, 55 STAN. L. REV. 969, 982 (2002).
149 Fair Housing Council, 2004 WL 3799488, at *1.
150 Id. at *4.
151 The Ninth Circuit turned out to be much more sensitive to this issue than the district court,
stating, "we must be careful not to exceed the scope of the immunity provided by Congress and thus
give online businesses an unfair advantage over their real-world counterparts, which must comply
with laws of general applicability." Roommate.com II, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 n.15 (9th Cir. 2008) (en
banc).
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publishing or distributing obscene or defamatory material written or
prepared by others.,,152
Understanding itself as acting modestly within the precedents, in
fact the district court broke new ground in using § 230(c) of the CDA not
only as a shield from liability for the common-law speech torts, but as a
battering ram to breach the formerly impregnable walls of § 3604(c),
eroding a protection for fair housing that appears not even to have been
contemplated by the drafters of the CDA.
3.

The Ninth Circuit Reversal: No Immunity For Creating and
Distributing Multiple-Choice Questionnaires and Answers, But No
Liability For Transmitting User-Created "Additional Comments"

Reasoning narrowly, the Ninth Circuit reversed solely on the second
of the district court's three bases of decision - whether, to what extent,
and with respect to what information, Roommate.com is an "information
content provider" under 47 U.S.c. § 203(f)(3). Judges Kozinski,
Reinhardt, and Ikuta all agreed that Roommate.com was to some degree
an information content provider. However, the three judges disagreed
about just how much of Roommate. com' s content exposed them to
potential liability on this basis. 153
The first important difference the Ninth Circuit identified between
Matchmaker and Roommate.com was how the website obtained the
potentially unlawful information. "The prankster in Carafano provided
information that was not solicited by the operator of the website.,,154
Matchmaker.com's website intended obviously only to solicit
information from speakers about themselves, not speech about anyone
else. In Carafano, the defamatory statements were made by one
wrongfully impersonating the speaker. In addition, providing some of
the information about Ms. Carafano (such as her actual phone number
and address) was a violation of Matchmaker.com's explicit rules. 155

152 1d. at *4. The decision is briefly analyzed in Karen S. Frank and Stephen M. Fronk.
Online Liability 2006, CABLE TELEVISION LAW 2006: COMPETITION IN VIDEO, INTERNET, AND
TELEPHONY 383, 422 (Practicing Law Institute, 2006); Stephen M. Fronk, Online Liability 2007,
CABLE TELEVISION LAW 2007: COMPETITION IN VIDEO, INTERNET, AND TELEPHONY 851,892-93
(Practicing Law Institute, 2007); Real Estate Listings: Internet Roommate Service, 35-MAR REAL
EST. L. REP. I (March 2006); Leslie Paul Machado, Immunity Under § 230 Of The Communications
Decency Act of 1996: A Short Primer, 10 J. INTERNET L., Sep. 2006, at 9; and in more detail by
Jeffrey M. Sussman, Cyberspace: An Emerging Safe Haven For Housing Discrimination, 19 Loy.
CONSUMER L. REV. 194, 207 -II (2007).
153 Roommates.com I, 489 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2007).
154 Id. at 928.
155 1d, (citing Carafano Y. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119,1121 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Notwithstanding its broader language, the rule of Carafano, as read by
the Roommates.com I court, is that there is only "CDA immunity for
information posted by a third party that was not, in any sense, created or
developed by the website operator-indeed, that was provided despite the
website's rules and policies.,,156 The Roommates.com I court continued,
"we do not read [Carafano] as granting CDA immunity to those who
actively encourage, solicit and profit from the tortious and unlawful
communications of others." 157
By contrast, Roommate.com does much more than merely passively
publish information sent to it by members (or even solicited from them).
Roommate also channels the information based on members' answers
to various questions, as well as the answers of other members. Thus,
Roommate allows members to search only the profiles of members
with compatible preferences. . .. Roommate also sends room-seekers
email notifications that exclude listings incompatible with their
profiles. . .. While Roommate provides a useful service, its search
mechanism and email notifications mean that it is neither a passive
pass-through of information provided by others nor merely a
facilitator of expression by individuals. By categorizing, channeling
and limiting the distribution of users' profiles, Roommate provides an
additional layer of information that it is "responsible" at least "in part"
~
. or deveIopmg.
. 158
lor
creatmg

It is, therefore, an "information content provider" under 47 U.S.C. §
230(f)(3) 159 as to this information, and not entitled to immunity.

On the other hand, Roommate.com also permits users to post
"Additional Comments" about themselves or the roommates they seek, in
response to the query, '''[w]e strongly recommend taking a moment to
personalize your profile by writing a paragraph or two describing
yourself and what you are looking for in a roommate. ",160 Although this
information frequently expresses discriminatory preferences,161 the Ninth
Circuit concluded that "Roommate's involvement is insufficient to make
it a content provider of these comments,,162 for three reasons:

156 Roommates.com I, 489 F.3d at 928 (citing Cara/ano, 339 F.3d at 1121) (first emphasis
added; second emphasis in original).
157 Roommates.com I, 489 F.3d at 928.
158 Id.at 928-29.
159
Id .
160

Id.

161 Id. (" 'Pref[erl white Male roommates,' ... 'NOT looking for black muslims.' ... 'drugs,
kids or animals' or 'smokers, kids or druggies,' ... 'psychos or anyone on mental medication').
162
Id .
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Roommate's open-ended question suggests no particular
information that is to be provided by members;
[2] Roommate ... does not prompt, encourage or solicit any of the
inflammatory information provided by some of its members.
[3] ... Roommate [does not] use the information in the 'Additional
Comments' section to limit or channel access to listings. 163
[1]

In this opinion, the Ninth Circuit took a very fine-grained, rather
than holistic, approach to determining whether and to what extent
Roommate.com is a potentially liable "information content provider."
a.

Judge Reinhardt's Holistic Analysis

Judge Steven Reinhardt, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
advocated broader potential liability for interactive computer service
providers who do more than passively transmit information entirely
created by users. He would hold "that none of the information that the
[FHC] challenge[s] satisfies the test for §230(c) immunity."I64 On his
view, Roommate.com is "responsible in part for creating or developing
information," hence disqualified from immunity as an "information
content provider," if it either "categorizes, channels and limits the
distribution of information, thereby creating another layer of
information," or "actively prompts, encourages, or solicits the unlawful
information.,,165 In Reinhardt's view, Roommate.com does both of those
things not only with respect to the questionnaires (and their answers), but
also in the "Additional Comments" section, and hence should not be
immune for that content either. 166
With respect to distribution of information expressing unlawful
preferences, Reinhardt notes that the material sent to users "aggregates
an entire profile [including 'Additional Comments'] and presents it as a
whole.,,167 In Reinhardt's view, "when Roommate provides an additional
layer of information by channeling the completed user profiles, that
additional layer of information includes the 'Additional Comments'
section with the various responses," 168 negating any immunity for the
content of the "Additional Comments." Because the recipient of
"roommail" from Roommates.com receives an integrated profile,

163

Roommates.com I., 489 F.3d at 928.

Id. at 930 (emphasis in original).
165 ld .
166
ld.
164

167
168

1d. at 931.
Roommates.com I" 489 F.3d at 931 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
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"[t]here is no justification for slicing and dicing into separate parts the
material that Roommate elicits and then channels as an integral part of
one package of information to the particular customers to whom it
selectively distributes that package." 169 Reinhardt harmonizes this
approach to that taken in Batzel, in which the unit of analysis was the
entire e-mail message, rather than selected portions of it. 170
Furthermore, Reinhardt argues, contra Kozinski's opinion for the
majority, that Roommate.com does "prompt, encourage, or solicit"
discriminatory information in the "Additional Comments."
In
Reinhardt's view, because the "Additional Comments" section
immediately follows a section that includes multiple-choice questions
about gender, sexual orientation, and familial status, "ordinary users
would understand the recommendation to constitute a suggestion to
expand upon the discriminatory preferences that they have already listed
and to list their additional discriminatory preferences in that portion of
the profile."l7l In support of this claim, Reinhardt cites both the
testimony of a Roommate.com executive about his intentions for the
"Additional Comments" section (for example, that religious preferences
be expressed to "avoid the need to contact and interview dozens of
incompatible people" 172), and the actual discriminatory preferences

169

Id.

at 931 (citing Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003)).
17l Roommates.com I, 489 F.3d at 932.
172 Id. Note, however, that there is no requirement that discriminatory intent be shown to find
a violation of § 804(c). Rather, the issue is what an "ordinary reader" would infer. See, e.g.,
Housing Rights Center v. Sterling, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1193 (C.D.Cal. 2004) ("In prohibiting
advertisements, statements, or other notices which indicate a discriminatory preference in the context
of the selling or renting of a dwelling, § 3604(c) does not require evidence of discriminatory
intent."); Fair Hous. Congo V. Weber, 993 F. Supp. 1286, 1290 (CD.Cal. 1997) (noting that an oral
or written statement violates § 3604(c) if it suggests a preference, limitation or discrimination to the
"ordinary listener or reader"). See also Chew v. Hybl, No. C 96-03459 CW, 1997 WL 33644581, at
*5 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 9, 1997) in which the court noted:
170 Id.

While the Ninth Circuit has not decided whether a plaintiff must show that the defendant
acted with discriminatory intent in order to establish a § 804(c) violation, other circuits that
have addressed the issue have concluded that such a showing is not necessary. See Jancik v.
Dept. of Housing & Urban Development, 44 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir.1995) (analyzing
statutory language and determining that ordinary reader standard applies); Ragin V. New York
Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999 (2d Cir.1991) (same); Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc.
v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 943 F.2d 644, 646 (6th Cir.1991) (acknowledging ordinary
reader standard); Spann V. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 29 (D.C.Cir.l990) (same),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 980 (1972); United States V. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 215 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 934, (1972) (applying ordinary reader standard). Those courts that analyzed
the statute relied on the plain meaning of the verb "indicates." "Giving that word its common
meaning, we read the statute to be violated if an ad for housing suggests to an ordinary reader
that a particular race is preferred or dispreferred for the housing in question." Ragin, 923
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abundantly expressed therein. 173 While this is perhaps of limited
persuasive force (it seems likely that most persons filling out such forms
simply don't know which preferences are lawful to express and which are
not), more significant is that the "sample" profiles (and nicknames)
posted by Roommate.com, which new users are invited to preview,
include such unlawful preferences. 174 Taken together, Reinhardt may
overstate things slightly, though not unreasonably, when he concludes
that the suggestion to "personalize" one's profile through "Additional
Comments" "is in essence an invitation to elaborate on discriminatory
preferences already listed and to list others such as race, religion, or
national origin." 175
Reinhardt's approach has the advantage of treating the entire e-mail
message transmitted to the user in the same way the courts would view a
rental real estate advertisement published in a newspaper. While it might
appear that this would impose a significant administrative burden on
Roommate.com (must they now read and analyze the content of the
"Additional Comments" of every user from the point of view of the
FHA ?), arguably all Roommate.com would need to do is post an explicit
instruction about the sort of information that may not lawfully be
included in the "Additional Comments" section (and eliminate such
content from any "sample" profiles). 176 In this way, they would cease to
"prompt, encourage, or solicit" such information, and in fact, would do
the contrary. If Roommate.com were to establish such a practice, any

F.2d at 999; see also, Jancik, 44 F.3d at 556. "[Tlhe statute prohibits all ads that indicate a
racial preference to an ordinary reader whatever the advertiser's intent." Ragin, 923 F.2d at
1000; see also, Jancik, 44 F.3d at 556. The Court agrees that the ordinary reader or listener
standard applies to the question of whether a statement violates section 804(c).
173 Roommates.com I, 489 F.3d at 932·33.
174 1d. at 933.
175/d.

writing before Carafano, Craigslist, and Roommate.com II were decided,
addressed some of the practical aspects of regulating online advertisements for violation of the FHA,
and concluded,
176 Chang,

Requiring OSPs to monitor their own housing listing services for illegal discriminatory
preferences thus does not impose a heavy or impossible burden. In contrast, the resourceful
application of existing automatic blocking technology can render the burden a minimal one.
In the context of fair housing, there is no need to commit personnel resources to conducting
extensive factual research to determine the truth or falsity of each statement, and no need to
make complicated, expert legal judgments. The burden of fair advertising liability is an
eminently reasonable one that does not require a large, ongoing expenditure of asp capital
and would not threaten the continued rapid development of the Internet.
Jennifer Chang, Note, In Search of Fair Housing in Cyberspace: The Implications of The
Communications Decency Actfor Fair Housing on the Internet, 55 STAN. L. REV. 969, 1007 (2002).
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information posted by a third party in violation of that rule should bring
Roommate.com under the protection of Carafano, where there was no
liability for information posted in violation of the site's own rules. 177
b.

Judge Ikuta: Immunity For User-Generated Content

In contrast to Judge Reinhardt, who would hold Roommate.com
potentially liable not only for the questionnaire and its answers, but for
any information selectively distributed along with the questionnaire as
part of an integrated profile, Judge Sandra Ikuta would give
Roommate.com immunity from publisher liability, under § 230(c),
reasoning that unless a website operator directly provides "the essential
published content," it is not an "information content provider" under
Carafano.,,[78 She read the prior case authority to have "explicitly held
that a website operator does not become an information content provider
by soliciting a particular type of information or by selecting, editing, or
republishing such information.,,[79 She cited, with approval, the broad
language of Carafano, concluding that "Under §230(c), therefore, so
long as a third party willingly provides the essential published content,
the interactive service provider receives full immunity regardless of the
specific editing or selection process.,,[80 Her opinion did not directly
address the issue of selective distribution, or roommate matching
(Roommate. com sends profiles only "to the particular members who
qualify to receive,,[8[ them, based in part on discriminatory categories
such as familial status). It would therefore appear that she concurred in
the judgment only to the extent necessary to determine "whether
Roommate violated the FHA by publishing its form questionnaires.,,[82

Had Roommate.com done so initially, there might have been no lawsuit. Counsel for Fair
Housing Council Gary Rhoades said:
177

his clients sent letters to various sites that run roommate advertisements and advised the
businesses that their practices ran afoul of federal and state housing law. According to
Rhoades, Roommates.com was the only site that did not change its listing policy. "It's pretty
easy (to screen comments) with software that will seek out discriminatory language," he
says. "The Web site probably already has that feature for strong profanity."
Stephanie Francis Ward, With Roomies-Be Careful How You Ask For Them: 9th Circuit opinion
appliesfair housing rule on discrimination to Web site, ABAJ. E-REPORT, May 25, 2007.
178 Roommates.com I, 489 F.3d at 934 (Ikuta, J., concurring in part) (citing Carafano v.
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003)).
179 Roommates.com I, 489 F.3d at 933 (Ikuta, J., concurring in part).
ISO Id. at 934 (Ikuta, J., concurring in part) (citing Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124).
181 Roommates.com I, 489 F.3d at 931.
182 1d. at 927.
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The Ninth Circuit En Bane Opinion

After the result from the three-judge panel, Roommate.com
petitioned for and obtained rehearing en banc on October 12, 2007. 183
The en bane opinion, also authored by Judge Kozinski, centers upon
Roommate.com's activities as a "content provider" "'responsible, in
whole or in part' for creating or developing" content on the site. l84 The
court makes clear that a website like Roommate.com "can be both a
service provider and a content provider. ... immune from liability for
some of the content it displays to the public but ... subject to liability for
other content.,,185 The court then turned to three potential liabilitycreating sorts of content: questions and answers; profile pages; and
"Additional Comments." The Ninth Circuit concluded that
Roommate.com is not immune from liability for the first two, but is not
liable for the third Gust as the first Ninth Circuit opinion had held).
The first category includes the questions and choice of answers
presented to subscribers. The Ninth Circuit deals with these relatively
summarily:
Roommate created the questions and choice of answers, and designed
its website registration process around them. Therefore, Roommate is
undoubtedly the 'information content provider' as to the questions and
can claim no immunity for posting them on its website, or for forcing
subscribers to answer them as a condition of using its services. 186

The last clause above opens into another form of conduct for which
Roommate.com is not immune: "inducing third parties [the subscribers]
to express illegal preferences." 187 This novel argument analyzed
Roommate.com's required drop-down menus of preferences (for
example, as to the sexual orientation of a roommate) as inducing
subscribers themselves to violate the FHA by expressing illegal
preferences. This "inducement" falls completely outside § 230(c). The
court concluded, "Roommate's own acts-posting the questionnaire and
requiring answers to it-are entirely its doing and thus § 230 of the CDA
does not apply to them. Roommate is entitled to no immunity.,,188 Given

183 Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com. LLC, 506 F.3d 716 (9th
Cir. 2007) (order granting en banc review).
184 Roommate.com 11.521 F.3d 1157, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
185
1d.

1d. at 1164.
187 1d. at 1165.
188
1d.
186
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this language, it is very difficult to see how Roommate.com can possibly
avoid liability on remand for the information it sought with its dropdown menus relating to membership in protected categories under the
FHA (and California law).
The court then turned to the profile pages, where information about
subscribers is displayed. The profile provides information about a
subscriber's own membership in protected classes (e.g., "Male"/
"Female"), that of others in the residence (e.g., "Straight male(s)"/"Gay
male(s)"), and preferences in roommates ("willing to live with 'Straight
or gay' males, only with 'Straight' males, only with 'Gay' males or with
'No males",).189 Similar information is displayed about children
(whether a subscriber has them, and/or is willing to live with them). 190
This information is useful to subscribers, obviously, and is also used by
Roommate.com "to channel subscribers away from listings where the
individual offering housing has expressed preferences that aren't
compatible with the subscriber's answers.,,191 Because Roommate.com
created the questionnaire, and compiles the profiles, the Ninth Circuit
majority was unequivocal in finding that Roommate.com is "the
developer, at least in part, of that information. And section 230 provides
immunity only if the interactive computer service does not 'create[e] or
deve1op[]' the information 'in whole or in part. ",192 "By any reasonable
use of the English language, Roommate is 'responsible' at least 'in part'
for each subscriber's profile page, because every such page is a
collaborative effort between Roommate and the subscriber.,,193 Any
other view, said the majority, "strains both credulity and English.,,194
Two important uses of the profile information, for which
Roommate.com is also not immune, are "the operation of its search
system, which filters listings, [and] of its email notification system,
which directs emails to subscribers according to discriminatory
criteria.,,195 This follows from the lack of immunity for the questions: "If
Roommate has no immunity for asking the discriminatory questions, as
we concluded above, it can certainly have no immunity for using the
answers to the unlawful questions to limit who has access to housing."I96

189/d.

at 1165.

Roommate.com 1/, 521 F.3d at 1165.
191
1d.
192 ld. at 1166.
193
1d.
190

194

/d. at 1166.

1d. at 1167.
196 Roommate.com 1/,521 F.3d at 1167.
195
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The Ninth Circuit made clear that it is the interaction with civil
rights laws that is significant, not the content of the preferences
expressed: "A dating website that requires its users to enter their sex,
race, religion and marital status through drop-down menus, and that
provides means for users to search along the same lines, retains its CDA
immunity insofar as it doe not contribute to any alleged illegality.,,197 As
(former) Fair Housing Council attorney Gary Rhoades trenchantly
pointed out, "there is no 'Fair Dating Act. ",198 But even a housing
website that permitted user-defined discriminatory criteria, but did not
require their use or otherwise "contribute[] to the alleged illegality"
would be immune. l99 Similarly, the constraints properly imposed on
Roommate.com would also apply to employment or educational sites. zoo
The third category of content analyzed by the Ninth Circuit consists
of the "Additional Comments" section. Like the first Ninth Circuit
opinion, the en bane opinion holds that § 230( c) provides immunity for
this material. The treatment is summary:
Roommate publishes these comments as written. It does not provide
any specific guidance as to what the essay should contain, nor does it
urge subscribers to input discriminatory preferences. Roommate is not
responsible, in whole or in part, for the development of this content,
which comes entirely from subscribers and is passively displayed by
Roomate .... This is precisely the kind of situation for which section
· d to provi'de Immumty.
.
. 201
230 was deSIgne

The court summarized § 230 immunity this way:
Where it is very clear that the website directly partICIpates in
developing the alleged illegality-as it is clear here with respect to
Roommate's questions, answers and the resulting profile pagesimmunity will be lost. But in cases of enhancement by implication or
development by inference-such as with respect to the "Additional
Comments" here-section 230 must be interpreted to protect websites
not merely from ultimate liability, but from having to fight costly and

197

ld. at 1169.

198

Panel discussion, University of La Verne College of Law, Ontario, California (February 6,

2007).
Roommate.com II, 521 F.3d at 1168.
200 ld. at 1169 n.25.
201 ld. at 1173-74. Contra Reinhardt's concurrence in the earlier opinion, the Ninth Circuit is
not persuaded that the presence of other discriminatory material encourages subscribers to express
discriminatory preferences in the "Additional Comments," saying, "the encouragement that bleeds
over from one part of the registration process to another is extremely weak, if it exists at all. Such
weak encouragement cannot strip a website of its section 230 immunity." ld.
199
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protracted legal battles .... The message to website operators is clear:
If you don't encourage illegal content, or design your website to
require users to input illegal content, you will be immune?02

This distinction limns "the edge of [this] rule of law," although the
court acknowledges, "Any immunity provision, including section 230,
has its limits and there will always be close cases .... [but] there can be
little doubt that website operators today know more about how to
conform their conduct to the law than they did yesterday.,,203
5.

Issues On Remand

In its initial complaint, FHC alleged three bases on which
Roommate.com violated § 3604(c) of the FHA: 204 (1) permitting
"nicknames" (or screennames) selected by users and posted by
Roommate.com, which are often racially or religiously identifying (e.g.,
"ChristianGrl, CatholicGirl, Asianpride, Asianmale, Whiteboy,
Chinesegirl, Latinpride, and Blackguy,,205); (2) posting "freeform
essays," written by housing providers, which express discriminatory
preferences (e.g. "'looking for an ASIAN FEMALE OR EURO GIRL' ;
'I'm looking for a straight Christian male'; 'I am not looking for freaks,
geeks, prostitutes (male or female), druggies, pet cobras, drama, black
muslims or mortgage brokers'; and 'Here is free rent for the right
woman ... I would prefer to have a Hispanic female roommate so she
can make me fluent in Spanish or an Asian female roommate just
because I love Asian females. ",206); and (3) posing questions that
"require[e] the disclosure of information about a user's age, gender,
sexual orientation, occupation, and familial status. ,,207
The Ninth Circuit en banc opinion made clear that Roommate.com
is immune for (2) above, the "Additional Comments,,,208 and it would
appear that (1), the nicknames, fall within that rationale. The issues
remaining on remand therefore all relate to (3).

202
203

[d. at 1174-75.
[d. at 1175 n.39.

201 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (prohibiting "any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to
the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to make any
such preference, limitation, or discrimination").
205 Fair Housing Council, No. CV 03-09386 PA(RZX), 2004 WL 3799488, at *2 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 30, 2004).
206 [d., at *2.
2m !d., at *2.

208

See supra notes 201-203 and accompanying text
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The fIrst issue explicitly left for the district court on remand is
"whether any of Roommate's questions actually violate the Fair Housing
Act or California law, or whether they are protected by the First
Amendment or other constitutional guarantees.,,209 However, the Ninth
Circuit reminded the district court "that asking questions certainly can
violate the Fair Housing Act and analogous laws in the physical
world.,,210
The second "merits" question left open is whether "the act of hiding
certain listings is itself unlawful under the Fair Housing Act, which
prohibits brokers from steering clients in accordance with discriminatory
preferences.,,211 The Ninth Circuit held "that Roommate is sufficiently
involved with the design and operation of the search and email systems which are engineered to limit access to housing on the basis of the
protected characteristics elicited by the registration process - so as to
forfeit any immunity" under § 230. 212 Put another way, if the roommatematching in which Roommate.com engaged constitutes illegal steering,
Roommate.com is not immune under § 230 for that conduct. As Judge
Kozinski instructed the district court, "If such screening is prohibited
when practiced in person or by telephone, we see no reason why
Congress would have wanted to make it lawful to profIt from it
online.,,213
With the remand of the case, the state law claims originally
pleaded by the Fair Housing Council are also revived. 214 In addition to
the FHA claim, the First Amended Complaint also stated causes of action
for violations of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act
(FEHA) and the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and claims for unfair business
practices and negligence,215 which were dismissed when the District
Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them. 216
FEHA, which prohibits discrimination based on "race, color, religion,

209

Roommate.com /I. 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (en bane).

210 Id.

1d. at 1169-70.
1d. at 1170.
213 1d. at 1167.
211

212

214 1d. at 1175 ("We vacate the dismissal of the state law claims so that the district court may
reconsider whether to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction in light of our ruling on the federal
claims").
215 Fair Housing Council, No. CV 03-09386 PA(RZX), 2004 WL 3799488,at *2 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 30, 2004).
216 1d. at *6.
There is no reason to believe the FHA in any way preempts these other
antidiscrimination laws. See, e.g., Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d 373, 376-83 (Cal. 1990).
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national origin, physical handicap, medical condition, ancestry, marital
status, sex and pregnancy," is significantly broader than the FHA.217
V.

Is THERE A FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUE HERE?

Although no First Amendment issue was before the Ninth Circuit, at
the district court level, Roommate.com (and other similarly-situated
interactive service providers) have argued and likely will continue to
argue that holding Roommate.com liable for discriminatory statements
made by persons posting to the websites is an impermissible restraint on
free speech.218
Timothy Alger, a partner at Los Angeles' Quinn Emanuel Urquhart
Oliver & Hedges, who represents Roommate.com,
maintains his client has First Amendment protection. People have the
right to choose whom they live with, Alger says, and he theorizes that
Fair Housing Act language about advertising property does not apply
to roommate situations. His appeal also argued First Amendment
protection, Alger says, but the court chose not to address it. If
Roommate.com does not prevail on its Communications Decency Act
theory, Alger says, his client will return to the trial court and argue the
First Amendment case. "It's absurd to say that people cannot select a
roommate based on criteria that's important to them," he says. "You
have a right to choose who you live with. The question is, can the
government regulate speech on that choice?,,219

Such arguments are not especially promising when it comes to violations
of §3604(c).
Thirty-five years ago, the Supreme Court ruled that a newspaper's
free speech rights were not violated by antidiscrimination laws which
prohibited classified "help wanted" ads which specified a particular sex
217 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ I 2940(a); 12945(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch.2 of 2008 Reg.
Sess. and Ch. 6 of 2007-2008 Third Ex. Sess. urgency legislation). Hejmadi v. Amfac, Inc., 249
Cal. Rptr. 5, 16 (Cal. App. 1988) ("The California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code.
§§ 12900·12998) prohibits discrimination against employees because of race, color, religion,
national origin, physical handicap, medical condition, ancestry, marital status, sex and pregnancy.
(Gov.Code. §§ 12940(a); 12945(a)").
218 Fair Housing Council, 2004 WL 3799488, at *5. The district court explicitly declined to
reach this issue. [d. The Ninth Circiut en banc opinion does the same. Roommate.com 11,521 F.3d
1157,1175 nAO (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).("We do not address Roommate's claim that its activities
are protected by the First Amendment. The district court based its decision entirely on the CDA and
we refrain from deciding an issue that the district court has not had the opportunity to evaluate").
219 Stephanie Francis Ward, With Roomies-Be Careful How You Ask For Them: 9th Circuit
opinion applies fair housing rule on discrimination to Web site, ABA J. E-REPORT, May 25, 2007.
Of course, § 3603(b) ensures that the "absurdity" to which Alger alludes does not in fact occur.
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for job seekers. 22o The Court there noted that the speech in question was
not only commercial speech, it was illegal commercial speech. 221 It
pointed out that the newspaper's argument for exemption from the
regulation would apply to advertisements promoting the sale of narcotics,
or soliciting prostitutes. "The illegality in this case may be less overt, but
we see no difference in principle here."m Although the case was
decided before the Supreme Court developed its doctrine protecting
commercial speech,223 the principle that the First Amendment does not
protect illegal speech remains in force. As a leading casebook states,
"The Court has consistently held that advertising of illegality is not
protected by the First Amendment. ,,224
Specifically, the constitutionality of § 3604(c) arose in Space
Hunters, and was treated rather summarily by the Second Circuit.
Defendants attempt to evade the sweep of section 804(c) [§ 3604(c)]
by invoking the First Amendment. Specifically, defendants claim that
"[u]nder the Government's expansive reading of [section 804(c)]
anyone who 'makers), a statement indicating discrimination in race,
religion, family status, etc. would be liable, including private
individuals who may state they do not like children living on their
block." Defs.' Br. at 42. Defendants are wrong. 'I[
While there may indeed be some cases in which the breadth of section
804(c) encroaches upon the First Amendment, this is not one of those
cases. This case (unlike defendants' hypothetical) unmistakably
involves commercial speech, a subset of speech for which the First
Amendment "'accords a lesser protection... than to other
constitutionally guaranteed expression.'" Courts have consistently
found that commercial speech that violates section 804(c) is not
protected by the First Amendment. 225

The Sixth Circuit was equally unsympathetic. In Campbell v. Robb,
the court stated, citing Pittsburgh Press,

Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
Id. at 388.
mId.
220

221

223
224

See Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1094 (3d ed.

2006).
U.S. v. Space Hunters, Inc., 429 F.3d 416, 425 (2d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Other
cases are in accord. See Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999 (2nd Cir. 1991); U.S. v.
Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 211-14(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972).
225
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§3604(c) may be constitutionally applied to [a landlord's]
discriminatory statement directly to [a prospective tenant], since it is
illegal commercial speech, akin to "a want ad proposing a sale of
narcotics or soliciting prostitutes," which the government may ban
outright without running afoul of the First Amendment. 226

Although it seems unlikely that any First Amendment argument in
relation to § 3604(c) will get much traction,227 it is worth noting that no
less an eminence than Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh
Circuit, in the Craigslist decision, has suggested that there might be First
Amendment problems with § 3604(c) as it applies to advertisements of
property covered by the § 3603(b) exemption. As he put it, "Although [§
3603(b)] does not take single-family homes outside the scope of §
3604(c), any rule that forbids truthful advertising of a transaction that
would be substantively lawful encounters serious problems under the
fIrst amendment.,,228 It can be anticipated that Roommate.com will make
an argument along these lines before the district court on remand.

VI. Is THERE Now A CIRCUIT SPLIT?
Even if the district court follows the implicit direction of the Ninth
Circuit and finds FHA (and FEHA) liability, actual implementation of
the decision may be considerably postponed. Should certiorari be
sought, it might well be granted. In the meanwhile, the opinion may be
subject elsewhere in the United States to the suspicion that, like 90% of
the Ninth Circuit cases heard by the Supreme Court in 2006-2007, it will
be reversed. 229 The Supreme Court Rules provide that a factor the court
will consider in determining whether certiorari shall be granted is if "a
United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the
decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important
matter. ,,230 Prior to the Ninth Circuit Roommate.com II decision, five
Campbell v. Robb, 162 Fed. Appx. 460, 470 n.7 (6th Cir. 2006).
227 Sussman concludes similarly. See Jeffrey M. Sussman, Cyberspace: An Emerging Safe
Haven For Housing Discrimination, 19 Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 194, 200 (2007).("the
constitutionality of 3604(c) is so well established that this article will not explore any First
Amendment freedom of the press arguments for website immunity").
228 Craigslist, 519 F.3d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 2008).
229 Brent Kendall, 9th Circuit is The Champion of Reversals, Los ANGELES DAII..Y J. I (July
3,2007).
230 SUP. CT. R. 10. The Supreme Court has not expressly defined a conflict between circuits;
the cases simply recite the rule as a justification for granting certiorari. See, e.g., U.S. v. O'Malley,
383 U.S. 627, 629 (1966) ("Because of these conflicting decisions [between the 7th and 1st Circuits)
we granted certiorari"); and Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 747-48 (1969) ("The holding of the
[Third Circuit) Court of Appeals with respect to [the Regulation) was contrary to the decisions of
226
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Circuits (and many district courts) had interpreted § 230 as imposing a
flat ban on the imposition of liability on the basis of information
provided by third parties. 231 Judge McKeown, in dissent, stated that the
"majority's decision, which sets us apart from five circuits, contravenes
congressional intent and violates the spirit and serendipity of the
internet.,,232 The dissenters clearly suggested that a conflict with other
circuits has been created.
Roommate.com II is certainly the most significant deviation from
the Zeran line of cases; but because most of the other cases do not
involve the FHA, it is possible to avoid characterizing the holding as a
conflict. The majority responded to Judge McKeown's suggestion, and
argued that no conflict is created. 233 Judge Kozinski contended that no
other circuit has considered "a case like ours" and that none "even
arguably conflicts with our holding today.,,234 He pointed out that the
Craigslist court also immunized the unprogrammed "Additional
comments," and carefully limited Roommate.com's potential liability. 235
Nevertheless, Roommate.com II is in fact the fIrst case to fInd a chink in
the armor of § 230. The cases from Zeran 236 through CraigslisP37 all
have sustained the statutory immunity.
It is possible to harmonize Roommate.com II with Craigslist by
focusing on the facts: one service has, and the other lacks, the offending
drop-down menus, and Kozinski labored to bring out the active role
Roommate.com played in the development of the potentially offending
content. But there is a larger issue having to do with the interpretation of
§ 230. Ultimately, the court must decide between the public policies
inherent in the CDA and the FHA. In piercing the immunity, the policy
against advertising expressing discriminatory preferences was elevated
above the immunity policy expressed in § 230. The strong public policy
which had been applied uniformly from Zeran forward 238 was
several other circuits-most notably, that of the Fifth Circuit. .. which explicitly sustained the
Regulation against attack.... Accordingly, upon the District Director's petition, we granted
certiorari to resolve the conflict.").
231 Craigsiist, 519 F.3d 666, 670-72 (7th Cir. 2008); Universal Communications Systems, Inc.
v. Lycos, Inc~, 478 F.3d 413, 418-421 (1st Cir. 2007); Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316,
1322-24 (11th Cir. 2006); Ben Ezra, Weinstein and Company, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 206 F.3d
980, 984-86 (10th Cir. 2000); Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330-331 (4th Cir. 1997).
232 Roommate.com II, 521 F.3d 1157, 1177 (9th Cir. 2008) (en bane) (McKeown, J.,
dissenting).
233 1d. at 1172 n.33.
234
235

Id.
{d.

See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.A.
238 See supra Part III.A., and the cases discussed in Jeffrey M. Sussman, Cyberspace: An
236
237
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subordinated to a policy overlooked by the drafters of § 230.
The Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990
addressed intercircuit conflicts, and requested that the Board of the
Federal Judicial Center conduct a study of "the number and frequency of
conflicts among the judicial circuits in interpreting the law that remain
unresolved because they are not heard by the Supreme Court." 239
Factors to be considered in the study include whether the conflict:
(1) imposes economic costs or other harm on persons engaging in
interstate commerce;
(2) encourages forum shopping among circuits;
(3) creates unfairness to litigants in different circuits, as in allowing
Federal benefits in one circuit that are denied in other circuits; or
(4) encourages nonacquiescence by Federal agencies in the holdings
of the courts of appeals for different circuits, but is unlikely to be
240
resolved by the Supreme Court.
The first three categories are triggered here. If some Circuits grant
immunity where the Ninth Circuit does not, the uncertainty may impose
economic costs on persons in interstate commerce. Those who believe
themselves to have been harmed by particular Internet postings would
forum-shop into the Ninth Circuit if they could; Internet service
providers would prefer fora with immunity. Most significantly, the
"benefit" of the immunity would be enjoyed in Circuits other than the
Ninth Circuit.
VI. CONCLUSION

The consistent holdings prior to Roommates.com I, and the strength
of the immunity policy, suggest that the Supreme Court may yet take
interest in this matter. Should the Supreme Court wish to address the
relationship between the CDA (and the Internet in general), and civil
rights laws, Roommate.com II presents that opportunity. As decided by
the en bane panel, however, it represents a legally well-reasoned defense
of the FHA and its civil rights imperatives against the unfettered
expansion of § 230 immunity. However robust the Internet speech
protections contained in § 230(c), the Ninth Circuit has correctly held
that the CDA does not relieve housing websites from their obligation

Emerging Safe Haven For Housing Discrimination, 19 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 194 (2007).
239 Pub.L. 10 1-650, Title III, § 302, 104 Stat. 5104 (1990), as amended by Pub.L. 102-572,
Title V, § 502(c), 106 Stat. 4513 (1992).
240

[d.
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under the federal Fair Housing Act (and related state civil rights laws) to
refrain
from
facilitating
and
disseminating
discriminatory
advertisements. Precisely because the Internet is such a powerful and
efficient means for bringing housing providers together with housing
seekers, it is imperative that those who benefit commercially from this
enterprise participate fully in implementing the goal of "fair housing
throughout the United States." Judge Kozinski's en banc opinion is a
ringing rejection of Internet exceptionalism: if conduct is "unlawful. ..
face-to-face or by telephone, [it does not] magically become lawful when
[it takes place] electronically online. The Communications Decency Act
was not meant to create a lawless no-man's-land on the Internet,,241and certainly not one of unregulated housing discrimination.

241

Roommate.com 11,521 F.3d 1157. 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (en bane).
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